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The recent Supreme Court decision in Stanford v. Roche laid bare a
faulty assumption of the federal research funding system. Government
patent policy for federally funded research relies on "contractors"-
the recipients of federal funding-to secure patent assignments from
their employees. While this practice was routine for private firms and
nonprofit research institutions, it was not for universities. This was in
part based on the relationship of faculty and other researchers to uni-
versities that differed from industry employment relationships. The
roots of this faulty assumption can be traced to the seminal 1947 Biddle
Report. Detailed monographs drafted as appendices to the Biddle Re-
port made plain these different practices. Yet the formal report glossed
over the differences in favor of a summary that government research
patent policy need only concern the relationship between the funding
agencies and contractors. This left assignments between the contrac-
tors and their employees to the contractors. Despite regulations up
through the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 that obliquely referenced the obli-
gation of contractors to secure adequate rights to protect the govern-
ment's interests, universities never adopted the assignment practices of
private industry. This Article traces the roots of this issue from the
Biddle Report to the current government regulations in order to clarify
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challenges that funding agencies and universities face in securing ade-
quate agreements from researchers in the wake of Stanford v. Roche.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal government is usually thought of as the issuer of patents.
But it also finances and practices patented inventions. Its position as sover-
eign initially led to confusion as to whether it could practice any patent
under a crown rights theory or assert rights to its employees' inventions. As
I have explored elsewhere, this led to three intertwined strands of govern-
ment patent policy: (i) government use of private citizen patents, (ii) govern-
ment rights to federal employee inventions, and (iii) government rights to
federal contractor inventions.' This Article focuses on the third strand, and
in particular the disposition of rights as between federal contractors and their
employees. This issue was at the heart of the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche
Molecular Systems, Inc.2 I argue that a faulty conclusion in a government
report at the dawn of university technology transfer led to decades of confu-
sion about the allocation of ownership to inventions at federally funded
universities.
The context for this issue resides in six partially conflicting narratives
about government patent policy. One is that the government, even as the
sovereign and issuer of patents, stands as an ordinary legal person with re-
gard to practicing patents issued to its citizens. A second is that the govern-
ment's unauthorized practice of a patent is simply the tort of infringement
and not a taking of property, so that eminent domain principles do not play a
role. A third is that the government as sovereign cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent, and the government has not consented to be sued
in tort. A fourth is that patents always vest ab initio with natural person
1. See Sean M. O'Connor, Taking, Tort, or Crown Right? The Confused Early History
of Government Patent Policy, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. IMIfuu. PRor. L. 145, 146-53 (2012).
2. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188 (2011).
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inventors. There can never be corporate person inventors such as there are
corporate person authors under the copyright work-made-for-hire doctrine.
A fifth is that the government should have some rights to the inventions it
finances, if not a public dedication of the inventions as created in trust for
the taxpaying American public. A sixth is that the allocation of rights be-
tween the government and contractor organizations should not strip em-
ployee inventors of their rights.
The seminal report on government patent practices was issued by Attor-
ney General Francis Biddle in 1947 (the "Biddle Report" or the "Report").'
The Biddle Report not only framed the debates over government patent pol-
icy for both intramural and extramural R&D for decades to come,4 but it also
introduced a crucial mistaken assumption that all government contractors
were routinely securing patent assignments from their employees. This arose
from a faulty conclusion in the Report's summary findings that glossed over
complicated evidence raised in seventeen monographs provided as appendi-
ces to the Report. While the detailed monographs showed that private firms
and most nonprofit research organizations were securing assignments, they
also indicated that only some universities were doing so. Nonetheless, the
Report concluded that contractors were securing title to employee inventions
and thus federal policy need focus only on the allocation of rights as be-
tween government agencies and their contractors. This recommendation sub-
sequently became a bedrock principle upon which all government patent
policy was based up through the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.1
Although Bayh-Dole focused on the allocation of title primarily between
government agencies and their contractors, it continued to rely on the mis-
taken Biddle Report assumption that contractors were securing assignments
from their employees. Bayh-Dole also failed to employ the language of a
"vesting statute" that would have transferred title from individual inventors
to another entity as a matter of law. 6 Thus, the Stanford Court held that
3. U.S. Di.,"'T OP JusCii, I INVESIGAION OF Govi;RNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND
Poiucin s: RiPORT1 AND RiECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AIroRNEY GENERAL TO- THE[ PRESIDENT
(1947) [hereinafter BIooiL REPoRT].
4. "Intramural" research means research done by government employees; whereas "ex-
tramural" research means research done under grants and contracts to non-governmental enti-
ties and individuals. See, e.g., Nat'l Hum. Genome Res. Inst., Frequently Asked Questions
About NHGRI Research, http://www.genome.gov/12011002 (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
5. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(209), 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
6. See Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2195-99. At the same time, Bayh-Dole provided a mech-
anism for contractor's employees to hold title to their inventions in cases where neither the
contractor nor the funding agency exercised rights they had under the Act. 35 U.S.C. § 202(d)
(2011). This provision was the basis for Stanford University and others to argue that Bayh-
Dole must be a vesting statute where employees must petition to get rights to their inventions
(i.e., the university and funding agency has superior rights). See Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at
2197-98; id. at 2200 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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contractors' employees held title ab initio to their inventions in the same
manner as other inventors.7
But this in turn leads to the question of how government rights to con-
tractor inventions can be secured if the contractor's employees are free to
retain title to their inventions or assign it to third parties. Why would the
government not have taken care of this by requiring assignments from a
contractor's employees to the contractors or passing a vesting statute that
allocated title to the contractor by operation of law? This Article reveals not
only the mistaken assumption that university employees were assigning their
rights to the university, but also the ways in which pre- and post-Bayh-Dole
government regulations sought to ensure that contractors were in fact secur-
ing appropriate rights to protect government interests. The Article also notes
that one reason why the Bayh-Dole assumption has not been disturbed is that
lawmakers may have had no need or desire to intervene in the complex ar-
rangements that contractors have with employees and independent contrac-
tors. This is especially true in the case of universities, which have quasi-
independent faculty, affiliated researchers, and students who sometimes act
as research employees.
Part I sets the stage and provides context for the issuance of the Biddle
Report. Part II then details the circumstances of the Biddle Report's faulty
conclusion as well as its adoption as a baseline assumption of government
patent policy in the Kennedy and Nixon administrations. This Part also notes
that regulations during this period did in fact impose obligations on contrac-
tors to secure adequate rights (if not full title) from their employees in order
to protect government interests. Part m sets out the passage of Bayh-Dole
and its implementing regulations, which continued the contractor obligations
set by earlier laws. Finally, Part IV reviews the case law involving contrac-
tors and their employee inventors and shows how the mistaken assumption
arising from the Biddle Report continues to generate confusion and chal-
lenges for government patent policy.
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE BIDDLE REPORT
As the twentieth century opened, three strands of government patent
policy existed including (1) government use of private citizen patents, (2)
title to government-employee inventions, and (3) title to contractor inven-
tions. While none of these were governed by statutory law,' significant case
7. Id. at 2194-99 (majority opinion).
8. See O'Connor, supra note 1, at 180. Government use of privately held patents was
limited to suit for compensation in the Court of Claims where the owner could establish a
breach of implied contract. Id. Government rights to employee inventions were limited, with
the normal result being a shop right license-even where the employee was hired to invent. Id.
Other than the Patent Act, the only other relevant statute at this time was a section of the
Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 625, regarding government employee inventions
which is discussed in more detail below.
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law had developed around the first two. The question of government rights
to contractor inventions remained untested by the courts.9 Once courts began
to address this question, some considered the relationship of the government
to its contractors as analogous to that of the government and its employees.
Accordingly, this section reviews the case law of government-employee in-
ventions to set the stage for the Biddle Report.
The cases fall into two different periods. The first period, running from
1870 through the end of the century, focused exclusively on the question of
whether government employees were bound by the same shop rights doc-
trine that bound private firm employees. The second period, running from
the 1920s until 1933, combined shop rights issues with changing interpreta-
tions of, and revisions to, an 1883 statute that authorized the Patent Office to
issue patents to government employees at no cost provided that such appli-
cants permitted free government use of the patented invention."o
The first set of cases originated from the 1870 Supreme Court decision
in Burns v. United States." In that case, the Supreme Court suggested in
dicta that if the government hired an individual specifically to invent some-
thing, then the government would have at least a shop rights nonexclusive
license, if not outright ownership of any resultant patentable invention.12
Two decades later, however, the Court directly ruled that a government em-
ployee could in fact retain title to a patent on an invention that he was hired
to invent, while denying his claims seeking compensation from the govern-
ment on a theory of unjust enrichment." This seemed to set a less onerous
standard of shop rights for government employees as compared to private
company employees who would have to assign the invention under these
same circumstances. 4 The Court later rejected a government employee's
claim that the license of his invention to the government was valid only so
9. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 180.
10. See supra note 8.
11. Burns v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246 (1870).
12. Id. at 252 ("If an officer in the military service, not specially employed to make
experiments with a view to suggest improvements, devises a new and valuable improvement in
arms, tents, or any other kind of war material, he is entitled to the benefit of it, and to letters-
patent for the improvement from the United States, equally with any other citizen not engaged
in such service; and the government cannot, after the patent is issued, make use of the im-
provement any more than a private individual, without license of the inventor or making com-
pensation to him." (emphasis added)). By contrast, however, private employers were able to
secure shop rights to inventions developed by employees using employer time or resources,
regardless of whether the employees were specifically hired to invent. See McClurg v. King-
sland, 42 U.S. (I How.) 202 (1843) (inventor's development of patented invention with em-
ployer's resources, pay raise for invention, and assent to its use by employer at no charge
established equitable or implied "shop right" license in employer).
13. Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
14. See, e.g., Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886) (holding that employee who had
been hired to invent must transfer patent title to his employer so long as he had expressly
agreed to do so).
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long as he was employed by the government, primarily because the license
did not explicitly state such a limitation.' 5 Turning to the question of patents
held by inventors before they became government employees, the Court af-
firmed a Court of Claims decision that such inventors do not receive unjust
enrichment when they seek compensation from the government for the use
of their patented inventions.16 At the end of the century, however, the Court
held that a government employee who invented on his own time, but then
used government resources to actually reduce the invention to practice and
also allowed it to be used by the government with no conditions or request
for compensation, had granted the government an implied license. 7
The second set of cases had its roots in the enactment of the 1883 stat-
ute, but the cases themselves were not decided until the 1920s and 1930s.
The statute was passed as part of an appropriations bill, but it was oddly
situated within the section for the United States Geological Survey (the
"1883 Act").'" It provided that:
The Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Patents are
authorized to grant any officer of the government, except officers
and employees of the Patent Office, a patent for any [eligible] in-
vention . . . when such invention is used or to be used in the public
service, without the payment of any fee: Provided, That the appli-
cant in his application shall state that the invention described
therein, if patented, may be used by the government or any of its
officers or employees in the prosecution of work for the govern-
ment, or by any other person in the United States, without the pay-
ment to him of any royalty thereon, which stipulation shall be
included in the patent.' 9
Although it seems most natural to read the emphasized clause to mean that
"any other person in the United States" encompassed only contractors en-
gaged in government work, this was debated in the courts. 20 Further muddy-
15. McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424 (1893). Two other decisions that year fur-
ther fleshed out the shop rights doctrine for private firms. In Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150
U.S. 193 (1893), the Supreme Court held that where an employee conducts experiments at his
private employer's expense, and then remains employed for a long time with full knowledge
that the resultant invention was being used by the employer, the employee would be deemed to
have granted an implied license to the employer. In Dalzell v. Dueber Watch-Case Manufac-
turing Co., 149 U.S. 315 (1893), the Supreme Court held that the express agreement required
to invoke the hired-to-invent exception and equitably convey patent rights to private employers
need not be in writing.
16. Talbert v. United States, 155 U.S. 45 (1894).
17. Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896).
18. Act of Mar. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 625.
19. Id. (second emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Squier v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 F.2d 747, 748-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
(discussing this controversy); see also id. at 752 (arguing that the "plain language" of the
statute required a public dedication of covered patents based in part on Patent Office's long-
384
The Real Issue Behind Stanford v. Roche
ing the waters, the Judge Advocate General of the Army changed positions
in 1918 from supporting the public dedication interpretation to adopt the
position that "any other person" meant government contractors only. 2 1
In 1928, the 1883 Act was amended to make clear that patents issued
under it were not dedicated to the public (the "1928 Amendment").12 How-
ever, some courts treated this as a change in the law, not a clarification.23
Further, some government departments had issued regulations requiring em-
ployees to file under the 1883 Act, with the express condition that the inven-
tion would then be dedicated to the public. 24 Thus, in one case, a court
upheld these regulations for a patent filed before the 1928 Amendment. 25
At the same time, some courts were expanding the scope of the hired-to-
invent exception to shop rights to find more instances where government
employees were required to assign their patents to the government. 26 In some
cases this seemed to be based upon a judge's belief that inventions arising
from taxpayer dollars should be freely available to all, notwithstanding the
standing, and apparently unchallenged, practice of stamping "Dedicated to the Public" legends
on patents issued under the statute).
21. See id. at 750.
22. Act of Apr. 30, 1928, 45 Stat. 467. Concerns over government-related patents as
early as World War I had led to the creation of the Army and Navy Patent Board. See Squier,
21 F.2d at 750. After the war, an unsuccessful bill sponsored by the Interior Department would
have provided for voluntary assignment or license of patents by any government employee to
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Co., 289
U.S. 178, 205-06 (1933). The FTC would then have licensed the patents to manufacturers,
with any resultant license fees paid into the Treasury and whatever portion might be deemed
equitable paid to the inventor. Id. In 1923, an ad hoc interdepartmental patents board recom-
mended regulations establishing that, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, government
employees retain ownership of their inventions. Id. The rationale was that a dedication to the
public would defeat the purpose and incentive of a patent. Id. at 206. It also strongly rejected
proposals that government employees be required to assign their inventions to the government,
on the basis that it would be very difficult to attract and retain talented individuals to the
already low paying government positions. Id. at 206-07. However, the board did recommend
legislation to establish a permanent board with the power to demand assignment of govern-
ment employee patents where the inventions were related to national defense or otherwise in
the public interest. Id. at 207. This may have been one of the roots of the later "vesting stat-
utes" assigning inventions to the government in matters of national interest and security. See
infra Part IlI.B.




26. See, e.g., Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (1928) (affirming a lower court
holding that assigned title to the government on a finding that even though the employee had
not originally been hired to invent, he was later engaged for a special project and paid solely
for that work). This decision was likely based in part on the Supreme Court's 1924 ruling in
favor of equitable assignment of title under the hired-to-invent exception in Standard Parts
Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924). The Court cited the dicta on the shop rights rule and its hired-
to-invent exception in Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890), and Gill v. United
States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896), as defining the standard in such cases. Houghton, 23 F.2d at 390.
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1928 Amendment.27 These developments limited the effectiveness of the
1928 Amendment for government employees.
The Supreme Court brought some clarity to these issues in its landmark
shop rights ruling, United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.28 The Court
affirmed the lower court's ruling that government employees who filed pat-
ent applications at their own cost, and not under the 1883 Act, did not have
to assign them to the government absent evidence that the employees were
hired to invent.29 The Court seemed to signal that the scope of the hired-to-
invent exception to the shop rights rule had expanded too far.30 It may also
have been signaling that it did not approve of the growing sense in some
circles that all inventions by government employees using government re-
sources should be dedicated to the public.3'
In summary, while contractor ownership of federally funded inventions
was not addressed in cases or statutes before the 1930s, there was extensive
development of the law regarding government employee inventions. In par-
ticular, this case law, together with that covering unauthorized use of private
citizen patents, 32 set the stage for the attempted creation of a formal govern-
ment patent policy. Five out of the six policy narratives listed in the intro-
duction were developed during this period. 33 First, it was established that the
government had no special rights to practice private citizen patents without
authorization. 34 Second, such unauthorized use was not a taking or exercise
of eminent domain, but only a tort.35 Third, because the government had not
consented to be sued in its courts for torts, this left aggrieved patent owners
with a sole remedy of compensation in the Court of Claims. 3 6 Fourth, owner-
ship of patents vests ab initio with the natural person inventors, and thus
neither a corporation nor the government could have original ownership of
an invention.37 And fifth, the government should have some rights to the
27. Id. at 391 ("It is unthinkable that, where a valuable instrument in the war against
disease is developed by a public agency through the use of public funds, the public servants
employed in its production should be allowed to monopolize it for private gain and levy a
tribute upon the public which has paid for its production, upon merely granting a nonexclusive
license [to the government].").
28. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
29. Id. at 182-85, 193, 203, 206.
30. This is suggested by the exhaustive manner in which the Court reviewed every
major relevant development in the law since Burns.
31. In fact, three justices dissented and sided with the government that federally funded
patents should be dedicated to the public. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 209-24.
32. See generally O'Connor, supra note 1.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
34. Although it did have a de facto shield against injunctions based on sovereign immu-
nity and the limit to compensatory damages in awarded in the Court of Claims under the Patent
Act of 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 612. See O'Connor, supra note 1, at 155-80.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The corollary of this is that ownership by corporations or the government could
only come about through assignments from the natural person inventors.
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inventions it funds, possibly including full public dedication. This left only
the sixth policy narrative-the question of how the relationship between the
government and a contracting entity should affect the invention rights of the
contractor's employees-completely unaddressed.
This sixth issue would only begin to be addressed when the government
began to consider a uniform patent policy for both intramural and extramural
research. However, most of the government's funded research was devoted
to agriculture and the development of land resources before World War
11-areas that had relatively few utility patents at that time. 9 Thus, there
was apparently little pressing need for a uniform government patent policy.
Yet, in both the private sector and in nonprofit research institutions, employ-
ers began routinely requiring assignments of all employee inventions.40 At
the same time, universities and their faculty varied widely as to assignment
practice and polices. 4 1 While some faculty began assigning their inventions
to their employing university as early as World War 1,42 other universities
either did not require assignments or, in some cases, would not even have
accepted them. 43 Some universities formalized institutional patent policies
that required, permitted, or prohibited assignments of faculty inventions."
Thus, going into World War II, the status of university assignment policies
was far from uniform, while industry norms and nonprofit research institu-
tions generally required assignment of employee inventions.
II. THE BIDDLE REPORT AND POST-WAR PATENT PoLICY INITIATIVES
FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH
As World War II ushered in a dramatic increase in federal funding of
intramural and extramural science and technology, the government found
38. See I BoiDDi REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
39. In fact, the Plant Patent Act was passed in 1930 both because plants were difficult to
patent under the regular utility patent system and because there was some precedent that they
were "products of nature" and thus not eligible for patent protection. See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310-14 (1980).
40. See I Boomri REPORT, supra note 3, at 88; 3 BIDiL REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-17.
41. 3 BIoo Ruroar, supra note 3, at 17-57.
42. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,212,945 (filed Oct. 3, 1915) (assigned to Kansas Agri-
cultural College); U.S. Patent No. 1,218,472 (filed Oct. 8, 1915) (assigned to University of
California, by agreement); U.S. Patent No. 1,392,767 (filed June 7, 1916) (assigned to Univer-
sity of Minnesota); and U.S. Patent No. 1,491,900 (filed Mar. 25, 1922) (assigned to Univer-
sity of Arizona). Accordingly, by the 1930s, a number of universities had adopted institutional
patenting policies. See RICHARD SPENCER, UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICIES (1939). The Author
thanks Gregg Graff for pointing out this source and the patent assignment citations.
43. 3 Bioot.t RE-PORT, supra note 3, at 17.
44. Archie Macinnes Palmer, University Patent Policies, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 96
(1934) (documenting that Columbia University, St. Louis University, and the University of
Illinois had instituted patent policies by the 1930s).
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itself funding patented inventions more than ever before.45 Therefore, Presi-
dent Roosevelt desired to finally establish a uniform, government-wide pat-
ent policy for government employees and contractors. 46 In 1943, he
requested that the Attorney General undertake a comprehensive investiga-
tion of the nature and extent of government patent policies. 4 7 The request
sought to answer a single question: "What disposition of patent rights as
between the Government, its employee or contractor, and what use of patent
rights owned by the Government, will best serve the public welfare and
stimulate the progress of science and the useful arts?"48
While the Biddle Report would not be issued for a few years, patent
policy concerning government research continued to progress. In 1944,
Roosevelt issued an executive order to create a separate register in the Patent
Office to record all government rights in patents. 49 The substantial increase
in extramural research funding also spurred agencies and departments to cre-
ate standard practices for research grants and contracts. By the end of the
war, both research contracts and grant funding agreements generally allowed
the contractor or the contractor's employees to retain title, while the govern-
ment took a nonexclusive license. 0 Accordingly, the issue of invention
rights between contractors and their employees was now formally
acknowledged.
A. The Biddle Report
In 1947, the Department of Justice issued the Biddle Report as its re-
sponse to Roosevelt's request. The Report spanned three volumes under the
title "Investigation of Government Patent Practices and Policies, Report and
Recommendations of the Attorney General to the President." It is hard to
overstate the influence of this document. Within it lay all the major concepts
of what would become the field of technology transfer. The Report also
framed virtually all of the policy debates that continue to this day.
45. 1 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-16. Approximately $1.7 billion was spent on
government research during World War I: the War Department alone spent an unprecedented
$800 million on overall R&D during the five fiscal years 1940-44, with two-thirds of that paid
under contracts to private industry, id. at 79; the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment spent almost half a billion dollars on extramural research from 1941-46, id. at 81; and
the Navy Department spent $400 Million during the fiscal years 1940-44, with 75% of that
going to extramural projects. Id. at 82. For an excellent general history of the development of
government patent policy from World War II to the 1990s, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government Spon-
sored Research, 82 VA. L. Rw. 1663 (1996).
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Exec. Order No. 9424, 9 Fed. Reg. 1959 (Feb. 22, 1944). Earlier attempts at track-
ing government patent rights were limited to specific departments or agencies. See, e.g., dis-
cussion supra note 22 (discussing the Army and Navy Patent Board).
50. See I BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 3, at 77-86.
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The Biddle Report's summary sets out the structure of its content. It
provides both "findings and conclusions" and "recommendations" for each
of eight topical areas: (i) "Patent Aspects of Government Research," (ii) "In-
ventions Made By Government Employees," (iii) "Rewards to Employees,"
(iv) "Inventions Made By Government Contractors," (v) "Administration of
Government-Owned Patent Rights," (vi) "Foreign Rights," (vii) "Secrecy,"
and (viii) "Uniform Patent Policy and Procedure."'5 The findings and con-
clusions are perhaps too conclusory and are better described as normative
policy positions. The Report was based on research compiled in seventeen
monographs accompanying the publication as appendices. One of its major
themes is that the use of public funds for R&D should lead to public control
and access to any resultant inventions. While the fourth topical area of the
Report is the most relevant to this Article, some of the other sections provide
helpful context. The recommendations of the second section advocated a
stricter hired-to-invent rule for government employees than had been found
as a matter of common law by the Dubilier Court.52 Those of section five
suggested that all government-owned patents should be made freely availa-
ble to the public, either through public dedication or royalty-free nonexclu-
sive licenses." And the findings in the eighth section recommended that the
government should establish a Government Patents Administration to ad-
minister a government-wide uniform patent policy. 5 4
The recommendations of section four for contractor inventions are cen-
tral to the development of Bayh-Dole, and ultimately the contractor's em-
ployee issue in Stanford v. Roche. They are covered in detail in chapter four
of the Report." The first recommendation called for government agencies to
stipulate in all R&D contracts that the government would own all rights to
51. Id. at 2-8.
52. The government should obtain all rights to inventions made by government employ-
ees: (i) during working hours; (ii) with a substantial contribution by the government in the
form of facilities, equipment, materials, funds, information, time paid for by the govemment,
or services of other government personnel; or (iii) which bear a direct relation to the em-
ployee's official duties. Id. at 2. In cases of minimal use of government resources or a tenuous
relationship between the invention and the employee's official functions, ownership could be
left with the employee, provided that the government retained a perpetual, nonexclusive, irrev-
ocable, royalty-free license to make, have made, use and dispose of the invention, and pro-
vided further that the employee was obligated to exploit the invention diligently herself or
grant nonexclusive licenses at a reasonable royalty to all applicants. Id. at 3. In all other cases,
rights should be left to the employee. Id.
53. Id. at 6. If further risky development were needed so that private firms could market
the invention, then the government should finance such development. Id. However, the Report
still maintained that patenting of such inventions was superior to simply dedicating them to the
public, because patenting would afford greater protection and control of the invention for the
public interest. Id.
54. Id. at 8. One objective of the government-wide policy was to "avoid competition
among the agencies, and . . . strengthen the government's bargaining position." Id.
55. Id. at 76-110.
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inventions arising under those agreements.16 The second allowed that if the
head of an agency certified that an "emergency situation" existed, then with
the approval of a central Government Patents Administrator the agency
could award a contract allowing the contractor to retain title to any patenta-
ble inventions arising under it.17 However, any such exceptional contract
would be subject to the following conditions: (a) the head of the agency and
the Administrator would certify that the agency made reasonable, but unsuc-
cessful, efforts to find a contractor that would accept federal ownership of
patents; (b) the contract would stipulate that the contractor would retain pat-
ent rights only to those inventions in which its independent contribution an-
tedated the work called for in the contract; (c) the contractor would grant the
United States a perpetual, nonexclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license to
make, have made, use, and dispose of any inventions awarded to it under the
contract; and (d) the contractor (or its assignee) would agree to place the
invention in adequate commercial use within a designated period, and if the
government determined that such use was not being made by the end of such
time period, then the contractor (or its assignee) would be required to offer
nonexclusive licenses at a reasonable royalty to all applicants."' The license
and commercialization conditions became bedrock components to govern-
ment patent policy. Ultimately, these conditions would be codified as the
"Government License" and "March-in Rights," in Bayh-Dole, by way of the
Kennedy Patent Policy" and the General Services Administration ("GSA")
Regulations, respectively.so The government contractor findings and recom-
mendations also established the terminology and two basic patent policy
models of "title" and "license." In a title model, the government would take
title to the inventions. In a license model, the contractor would retain title,
but grant the government a nonexclusive license. Finally, the third and
fourth recommendations were for government agencies to treat cooperative
research projects and research grants, respectively, in the same manner as
R&D contracts.6'
So far so good, but the chapter four's focus was almost exclusively on
the relationship between contractors and government, with little regard for
the rights of a contractor's employees. 62 It only briefly summarized the law
56. Id. at 76.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See infra Part I.B.
60. See infra Part II.C.
61. See I BIDDIU, RroRT, supra note 3, at 76.
62. Id. at 77 ("Since the relationship between the Government and the contractor arises
from an agreement between them, their rights and obligations depend essentially upon the
terms of the agreement and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. The contract may explicitly
dispose of rights to inventions made in the course of performance, either in toto to one of the
parties or in part to each. For example, the Government may expressly obtain the right to an
assignment of all patent rights, or may reserve only a nonexclusive license leaving the patents
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regarding inventorship and initial ownership of patents (which remains the
same today)63 to make clear that patent rights vest ab initio in natural person
inventors:
Under our law, a patentable invention can be made only by an indi-
vidual or by several individuals working jointly. Since the Govern-
ment contractor is usually a corporation or an institution, the latter's
agreement to make some or all of the patent rights available to the
Government requires a corresponding obligation on the part of the
contractors' employees who engage in performing the research con-
tract. Such an obligation is as a general rule imposed expressly by
the employment contract.M
It then summarized the extensive research that the Attorney General's staff
performed on the actual practices of private industry, nonprofit research or-
ganizations, and universities, as reported in the monographs, and declared
that:
[T]he scientific and technical employees of almost all industrial or-
ganizations are under contract to assign their patent rights to the
employer, and most academic and other noncommercial institutions
likewise require assignment of patent rights by members of their
staff who have been detailed to perform research contracts with
third parties.65
This summary put particular emphasis on the monograph finding that em-
ployees of nonprofit contractors were willing to dedicate their inventions to
the public or assign them to the government. 66 The drafters thus concluded
that: "the disposition of rights to inventions made under a Government-fi-
nanced research contract involves the allocation between Government and
contractor of the power to exclude others from using the invention, or to
permit such use upon payment of a royalty or compliance with some other
legal condition."67 This left the task of securing rights from contractors' em-
ployees to the contractors. The Report never explicitly recommended that
to the contractor; or the parties may agree that the resulting inventions should be dedicated to
the public. The courts will respect and enforce any disposition thus agreed to so long as no
statute or other dominant rule of law stands in the way.").
63. See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131
S. Ct. 2188, 2194-95 (2011).
64. 1 Bi:Loi REPoRT, supra note 3, at 78.
65. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., id. at 79 (stating that nonprofit contractor employees working on Depart-
ment of the Interior cooperative research agreements generally either dedicate their inventions
to the public or assign them to the Department). These points also seemed to support the
recommendation that the government should implement a title policy because willing contrac-
tors could be found who would agree to assign their inventions to the govemment.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
391Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:379
government policy should step into the contractor-employee relationship. In
this way, it simply mirrored business-to-business contracting in which each
legal entity is responsible to secure the necessary IP, confidentiality, and
other rights from its employees and independent contractors. But this reli-
ance on the other party's arrangements with its employees only works where
the parties require assignments and confidentiality as a rule. It does not work
so well when one of the parties either cannot or customarily does not require
such obligations from its employees.
The question then becomes: how well did the Report monographs actu-
ally support the statement that "most academic and other noncommercial
institutions likewise require assignment of patent rights by members of their
staff who have been detailed to perform research contracts with third par-
ties?" 68 The two most relevant monographs to this analysis are "Patent Poli-
cies and Practices of Educational and Other Nonprofit Organizations" (the
"Educational and Nonprofit Monograph")69 and "Principles of Law Applica-
ble to the Interest of the United States in Inventions Made by Its Employees
and Contractors" (the "Law Monograph").70 The first separated its discus-
sion into "Private Research Organizations" and "Educational Institutions.""
It surveyed the patent practices of seventeen research organizations. 72 Yet,
while the Educational and Nonprofit Monograph concluded that "[p]rivate
research organizations . . . require their inventors to assign or dedicate their
inventions as directed," 73 only five out of seventeen organizations discussed
had express employee-invention assignments in place. 74 The report implied
68. Id. at 88.
69. 3 BIDDi E Rurowr at 3-57.
70. Id. at 127-61.
71. See id. at 3.
72. The Mellon Institute of Industrial Research, Battelle Memorial Institute, Trade As-
sociation Research Groups, American Petroleum Institute, Underwriters' Laboratories Inc.,
Research Corporation, Chemical Foundation, Franklin Institute-Bartol Research Foundation,
Carnegie Institute of Washington, Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, John McCor-
mick Institute for Infectious Diseases, The Engineering Foundation, American Chemical Soci-
ety, American Medical Association, Midwest Research Institute, Southern Research Institute,
and Armour Research Foundation. See id. at 3-17. Note that one of these, "Trade Association
Research Groups," was really a generic name for the class of specific trade associations. See
id. at 6-7. In fact, two such specific groups-American Petroleum Institute and Underwriters'
Laboratories, Inc.-were themselves discussed separately as research organizations. See id. at
7-8. Thus, there were really only sixteen research organizations directly discussed.
73. Id. at 53-54.
74. These organizations are: The Mellon Institute of Industrial Research, id. at 5; Frank-
lin Institute-Bartol Research Foundation, id. at 12; Midwest Research Institute, id. at 14
(with regard to patent rights, the Monograph only states that "[ilndividual industries which
sponsor projects receive title to any resulting patents and the work is prosecuted in the degree
of confidence required by the company," however it seems a reasonable inference that the
Institute must then have assignment and confidentiality obligations in place from its research-
ers); Southern Research Institute, id. at 15 (similar to the text on Midwest Research Institute,
the relevant text here only says that "[aill discoveries resulting from sponsored projects be-
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that one organization had an assignment policy." Eleven others were prima-
rily foundations that sponsored or funded research at other institutions.
While this monograph noted that the foundations required either dedication
to the public or assignment of inventions arising from funded research, this
observation only provides that some research organizations receiving fund-
ing were able to secure rights from their researchers sufficient to do this. The
observation does not answer how many organizations did so, whether re-
searchers at those organizations were always bound to assign or dedicate
their inventions, or whether such researchers agreed to do so only for pur-
poses of the funding agreement from the foundations. Thus, the conclusion
of the Educational and Nonprofit Monograph regarding private research or-
ganizations is technically correct, but a bit misleading. It also suffers from a
small sample-especially when one considers that only five, possibly six, of
the organizations were shown to have blanket assignment policies for their
employee researchers.
The section on educational institutions in the Educational and Nonprofit
Monograph is even more problematic. Of forty universities surveyed, only
eight had what I call "unconditional general assignment" policies, 6 under
which staff were obligated to assign all inventions. From the remaining
thirty-two, ten schools required assignment only for special projects or spon-
sored research. 7 In these cases, a number of the projects requiring assign-
ment were limited to health or medicine. Four universities decided allocation
of title on a case-by-case basis.8 Four universities had a strong shop-rights-
type allocation system in place whereby inventions made using university
facilities must be assigned to the university. 9 One university had a
mandatory assignment of all rights within the state in which the school was
come the exclusive property of the sponsor," likewise clearly implying that the Institute has
the requisite rights from researchers); Armour Research Foundation, id. at 16.
75. The John McCormick Institute for Infectious Diseases "adopted a policy in favor of
taking out patents at the expense of the Institute and dedicating them to the public 'in such
manner as the Institute may deem most effective."' Id. at 13. Thus, it would seem that the
Institute must have had assignment agreements in place with its researchers, although this is by
no means certain based only on the details in the Educational and Nonprofits Monograph.
76. California Institute of Technology, University of Chicago, University of Florida,
Georgia School of Technology, University of Illinois, Iowa State College, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, University of Notre Dame. See id. at 18, 20-23, 29-33, 36-37, 41.
77. University of Cincinnati, Columbia University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins
University, Lawrence College, University of Maryland, University of Michigan, University of
Minnesota, Princeton University, and University of Wisconsin. See id. at 23-28, 31, 33-34,
36, 37-41, 44-45, 51-53.
78. University of California, Purdue University, Stanford University, and Virginia Poly-
technic Institute. See id. at 18, 45-46, 47-48.
79. Carnegie Institute of Technology, Lehigh University, University of Pennsylvania,
and Pennsylvania State College. See id. at 20-43. In the normal shop rights system, employees
would only be required to assign title if they were hired to invent the patentable invention. See,
e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-209 (1933).
393Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:379
located, with rights outside of the state left to the inventor. 0 Another had a
mixed system whereby rights to inventions arising from sponsored projects
were assigned, but all other inventions were allocated along the common law
shop rights rules."' The remaining twelve universities had no assignment
requirements at all (although many allowed or encouraged assignments
through an affiliated patent management entity of the university).8 2
Nevertheless, the Educational and Nonprofit Monograph summarizes its
survey by stating that "[i]n about one-half of the institutions . . . patent
rights . . . are to be assigned to the institution rather than retained by the
inventor.""' It appears that the drafters arrived at this estimate by grouping
together unconditional assignment schools with shop rights schools and
sponsored projects schools.' Further, the monograph lists four schools as
providing case-by-case assignments-but this list differs from mine." If
these are added to the total of "assignment" schools, then a majority of
schools surveyed "require" assignment. However, this is misleading, as pat-
ent policies were in flux, 86 and it was not clear whether government grants
would constitute "sponsored projects" at the sponsored projects schools. If
government grants did not fall within the definition of sponsored projects for
these schools, then the schools would effectively be "no assignment" schools
for purposes of government patent policy.87 In this scenario, only sixteen
80. Colorado School of Mines. See 3 Biooim RE-POR, supra note 3, at 24.
81. University of Maine. Id. at 35-36.
82. Cornell University, Dartmouth College, University of Kansas, Lafayette College,
Ohio State University, Rutgers University, St. Louis University, University of Texas, Univer-
sity of Toronto, State College of Washington, Wittenberg College, and Yale University. See id.
at 29-53.
83. Id. at 55.
84. The Monograph lists the following twenty schools: (i) California Tech, Carnegie
Tech, Chicago, Cincinnati, Florida, Georgia Tech, Illinois, Iowa State, Lehigh, Maine, M.I.T.,
Notre Dame, Pennsylvania, Penn. State, and Stanford; and (ii) Columbia, Johns Hopkins,
Harvard, Yale, and Colorado School of Mines. It expressly admits including shop right assign-
ment schools in (i) and schools that limit assignment to inventions in health or medicine in (ii).
Id. However, Cincinnati was a sponsored projects assignment school. See id. at 23-24.
Maine's shop rights system was that of the common law, and thus would normally grant shop
rights only to the school, except where the researcher was specifically hired to invent. See id.
at 35-36. That would put it more in the category of a sponsored projects assignment school. I
list it as a "mixed" school. And Stanford's assignments were done on a case-by-case basis. See
id. at 47-48. For that matter, California's assignments were done on a case-by-case basis as
well, and yet it is not listed as an assignment school. See id. at 18-19.
85. The Monograph lists California, Princeton, Purdue, ad V.P.I., id. at 55, while I list
California, Purdue, Stanford, and V.P.I.
86. A number of schools were formulating or changing policies, and in a number of
cases, adding patent management entities (and presumably forging policies to profit off pat-
ents) following the success of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. Id. at 18, 56-57.
87. By contrast, government contracts (and possibly cooperative research agreements)
might fall under the definition of sponsored projects at these schools. To the extent the school
entered into these kinds of government funding agreements, it could be considered an "assign-
ment" school.
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schools would then have assignment policies that would allow a grant award
agreement from the government to allocate patent rights." In health or
medicine, though, this would bring the total back up to twenty. Further, al-
though the sample size here is better than that for private research organiza-
tions, there also might be many more educational institutions than private
research organizations. Plus, a paper cited by the Report asserted that a ma-
jority of schools did not compel assignments except in cases of cooperative
research. 9 Accordingly, at best, only a slight majority of universities had
policies in place allowing for government funding agreements to allocate
patent rights (because the university's employees would already be obligated
to assign their rights). However, it was equally likely that this was the case
for half or fewer of surveyed universities. Therefore, any inference that
"most" universities required assignments for "members of their staff who
have been detailed to perform research contracts with third parties"90 was a
stretch (unless one interprets "most" to mean a slight majority), and relied on
government grants being considered to be sponsored projects within the pol-
icy of the sponsored projects assignment schools.
Even if "most" schools had policies supporting assignment in the case of
all types of government funding agreements, these policies could be changed
by the school at any time, and thus the Law Monograph attempted to explain
how contractors and their employees might still be bound in the absence of
clear contracts or policies. Restating the Educational and Nonprofit Mono-
graph, the Law Monograph stated that "[i]t is the general practice of many
industrial and institutional research organizations to require their employees
to assign to the employer any inventions made in the course of employ-
ment."9' While the drafters were careful to use the limiting qualifier "many,"
the impression this statement leaves is that as a general matter, employees
will be obligated to assign all inventions made in the course of employment.
But although this might have been true for industry, and even for private
research organizations, it was certainly not true for universities. And the
importance of having such a requirement was clear to the drafters: "Such an
arrangement guarantees the ability of the contractor to perform his undertak-
ing to the Government, for example, where the contract stipulates that the
resulting patent rights will be assigned to the United States."9 2 To cover the
88. The eight unconditional assignment schools, four case-by-case schools, plus the
shop rights schools.
89. Id. at 17-18 (quoting W.T. Middlebrook, Universities and Patents, Minutes of the
Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Central Association of University and College Business
Officers (Feb. 1945)).
90. 1 Biooim Ripowr, supra note 3, at 88.
91. 3 BIDDLE REPORT at 158 (citing both Educational and Nonprofit Monograph and
"Patent Policies and Practices of Industrial Laboratories Concerning Inventions of Employees
and Contractors," id. at 62-66 ("Industrial Monograph")).
92. Id. at 158 & n. 180 (citing Navy Monograph and War Monograph to support pro-
position that "[g]overnment research contracts frequently contain a provision whereby the con-
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obvious gap, the drafters then advanced the novel argument that "even
where there is no express agreement between the contractor and his employ-
ees, they may be held bound by the contract between the employer and the
Government if, with knowledge of its provisions, they accept a detail to the
research project authorized by the contract."93 To support both this point,
and the larger idea that even in the absence of a formal patent rights alloca-
tion clause courts will likely treat the contractor as an employee who is hired
to invent,94 the Law Monograph reviewed the "only case on point" for this
proposition: Ordnance Engineering Corp. v. United States, a Court of
Claims decision from 1929.95 The problem is that the Court of Claims
granted the government only a shop rights license to the federally funded
inventions and not ownership.96 The government had argued that it should
receive equitable title to the inventions, and the court quoted a statement
about equitable title from the government's brief.91 The Law Monograph
then attempted to elevate this statement to a rule of law, even as it conceded
that "a license was adequate to sustain the court's decision in favor of the
Government."' But there is simply no case law to support this. Further, the
difference between granting a hiring party a license to practice what was
developed for it and granting it ownership, in the absence of a contractual
assignment, is too great a distinction to gloss over. At the same time, be-
cause the case for contractors' equitable title assignment failed to find sup-
port in the courts, so also the Law Monograph's position that contractors'
tractor agrees that 'he has not entered into and will not enter into any arrangement or
agreement' which would affect his ability to grant to the Government the patent rights called
for by the contract").
93. Id. at 158.
94. Id. ("Where the contract is silent as to the rights of the Government in inventions
made by the contractor or his employees in the course of performing a Government contract,
and where no agreement as to the disposition of a resulting patent can be implied in fact, the
courts will in all probability apply the rules applicable to the employer-employee
relationship.").
95. Ordnance Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 301 (1929).
96. Id. at 353 ("We need not multiply the citation of authorities to sustain the rule that
where one is employed by another for development and experimental work the result of the
relationship is an implied license to the employer to use whatever invention develops from the
experiment.").
97. Id. ("As stated in defendant's brief: 'An employee employed to invent creates for
his employer, and an equitable ownership of the employer in the employees creation will be
enforced."').
98. 3 BIDDLE RiPORT, supra note 3, at 159 ("[T]he court was plainly of the view that a
Government contractor occupies the same position as a Government employee with respect to
rights in an invention made at the Government's expense and behest, and that if the Govern-
ment is entitled to an assignment of an invention from an employee, it is likewise entitled to an
assignment from a contractor under the same circumstances."). The Law Monograph also dis-
cussed McKinnon Chain Co. v. American Chain Co., 259 F. 873 (M.D. Pa. 1919), a case
involving private parties for the same proposition. But that case likewise only granted a shop
rights license. Id. at 878-89.
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employees should be found to have equitably transferred title to the hiring
party must also fail.99
These twin overstatements-that most universities require assignment
of employee inventions and common law rules would transfer equitable title
from contractors (and their employees) to the government-seem to have
led the drafters of the Report to conclude that government patent policy need
concern itself solely with allocation of title between the government and its
contractors. This faulty conclusion became a fundamental premise upon
which the entire edifice of government contracting and procurement policy
(including Bayh-Dole) was built.""' Besides being a problem in its own right,
this mistaken premise largely disappeared from view, turning into an un-
stated assumption that resulted in significant confusion over how govern-
ment patent policy with regard to contractors' employees was supposed to
work.
In retrospect, it is easy to see how tempting it must have been for the
drafters to jump to this faulty conclusion. First, private firms appear to have
been the primary recipient of federal R&D funding in this period. So the
arrangements they had with their employees would be the most important
factor for government patent policy. Conveniently, private firms routinely
secured assignments in advance. The speculation that contractors in univer-
sity settings did the same would therefore be understandable, especially con-
sidering that the Biddle Report expressly referenced other private firm
contracting principles-such as the established law of employee-invention
title allocation-as a model for government policy."" Thus, the Report can
be seen as a reasonable model for a government extramural R&D program
focused on private firms (and nonprofit research organizations). However,
the shift to universities as the locus of extramural research over the next
decades resulted in a fatally flawed assumption just as the foundation of
uniform government patent policy was being laid.
B. The Kennedy Patent Policy
No comprehensive government-wide patent policy was promulgated
throughout the 1950s. Instead, pieces of the Biddle Report's recommenda-
tions were implemented. In 1950, President Truman issued an executive or-
der adopting the Report's recommended rules for government-employee
99. This is, of course, distinct from the case- law-supported rules that employees who
are hired to invent must assign title to the employer.
100. See, e.g., Joseph P. Allen & Howard W. Bremer, It Ain't Necessarily So: Just Say-
ing that Bayh-Dole Gives Patent Ownership to University Inventors Doesn't Make It True, 6
Liup Sci. L. INous. Riuw. 415, 416 (2012) ("It is well established that organizations can require
their employees to assign patent rights for inventions made during the course of employment
to them. Bayh-Dole is based on this premise.").
101. 1 BIDDLE RPORT, supra note 3, at 78.
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invention rights. 0 2 Over the course of the decade and into the next, a number
of statutes were passed that allocated title as between the government and its
contractors.'03 Some of these were "vesting statutes" in which the normal
rule of inventor ownership was modified to vest title in a government or
government-related entity.'0 Meanwhile, various government agencies con-
tinued developing their own patent policies for extramural research."
In 1963, the Kennedy administration attempted to establish a uniform,
government-wide policy for extramural research (the "Kennedy Patent Pol-
icy").'0 It set out nearly all the key concepts and terminology of the modern
government R&D procurement and technology transfer system, with many
of them adapted from the Biddle Report." 7 The Kennedy Patent Policy also
included detailed requirements for contractors who acquired exclusive patent
rights."' In cases where the federal agency retained the patent rights, the
Kennedy Patent Policy imposed some conditions on the agency itself. 1'9 The
102. President Truman implemented the recommended shop rights and hired-to-invent
rules for government employees in Executive Order 10096, which as amended is still in force.
Providing for a Uniform Patent Policy for the Government with Respect to Inventions Made
by Government Employees and for the Administration of Such Policy, Exec. Order No. 10096,
3 C.F.R. 292 (1949-53), reprinted as amended in 37 C.F.R. § 501 (2012). The policy was
challenged as unconstitutional in the 1970s and 1980s but survived. Heinemann v. United
States, 796 F.2d 451 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding the Truman Order constitutional based on Exec-
utive powers and Congressional acquiescence for many years); Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d
1073 (7th Cir. 1976) (same).
103. Act of June 29, 1935, § 10(a), 49 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 427i(a)); Act of Apr. 5, 1944, § 3, 58 Stat. 191 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 323); Act of Aug.
14, 1946, § 205, 60 Stat. 1090 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1624(a)); National Science Foundation
Act of 1950, § 12, 82 Stat. 360 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1871(a)); Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
§ 152, 68 Stat. 943 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2182); National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958, § 305, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2457); Coal Research
Development Act of 1960, § 6, 74 Stat. 337 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 666); Helium Act
Amendments of 1960, § 4, 74 Stat. 920 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 167b); Arms Control and
Disarmament Act of 1961, § 32, 75 Stat. 634 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2572); Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961, § 219, 83 Stat. 806 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2179).
104. E.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 152, 68 Stat. 943 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2182)
(providing that title to inventions in the field of atomic energy "shall be vested in, and be the
property of, the [Atomic Energy] Commission"); see Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011).
105. See Government Patent Policy: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (Oct. 12, 1963) [hereinafter "Kennedy Patent
Policy"].
106. See id.
107. In particular, the core elements of the Government License and March-In Rights
were in place. Id. § 1(b), 1(f)-(g).
108. Id. § I (e)-(h). For example, the contractor would have to submit periodic written
reports to the funding agency regarding progress on commercialization of the invention. Id.
§ 1(e).
109. For example, if the funding agency chose not to file for foreign patents, then the
contractor would be able to file for that patent subject only to a non-exclusive license to the
government for governmental purposes and on behalf of any foreign government that would
get such rights under a treaty or agreement with the United States. Id. § 1(h).
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key divergence of the Kennedy Patent Policy from the Biddle Report was
that the former sought to establish a balance between government and con-
tractor ownership of patents arising from federally funded research,'"' while
the latter had advocated government ownership or public dedication. Under
the Kennedy Patent Policy, funding agencies should consider whether inven-
tions arising under federal funding agreements could be practiced directly by
the public (e.g., a farming technique), or whether intervening R&D and pri-
vate initiative was needed to commercialize the invention (e.g., a complex
manufactured device)."' The Kennedy Patent Policy seemed primarily fo-
cused on contractors in the private sector rather than contractors from uni-
versities and nonprofit research organizations. Contractors who retained title
or exclusive rights under the Kennedy Patent Policy had to bring those in-
ventions to "the point of practical application," defined as "to manufacture
in the case of a composition or product, to practice in the case of a process,
or to operate in the case of a machine and under such conditions as to estab-
lish that the invention is being worked and that its benefits are reasonably
accessible to the public.""l2
Most importantly, the Kennedy Patent Policy addressed allocation of
patent rights only between the government and its contractors. Because the
Policy so closely tracked the Biddle Report, it can be inferred that it relied
on the Report's faulty conclusion that contractors would secure necessary
assignments from employees. This was reasonable given the Kennedy Patent
Policy's focus on private firms. But this reliance cemented the transforma-
tion of a faulty conclusion into a premise, and later into an unstated assump-
tion underlying all future government patent policy for extramural research.
In the end, however, the Kennedy Patent Policy was never implemented in
government-wide regulations, largely because of the myriad patent title allo-
cation statutes Congress passed during this period.' '
The Kennedy Patent Policy also commissioned the Harbridge House
Government Patent Policy Study issued in 1968 (the "Harbridge House Re-
port").1 4 While its overall findings were inconclusive, it generated specific
findings that shaped the debates in the 1970s concerning government patent
policy. First, it suggested that the NIH Medicinal Chemistry Program was
hindering the commercialization of pharmaceutical compounds by discour-
aging R&D firms from participating in it due to the mandatory allocation of
110. Id. at 10,943 ("[T]he public interest might also be served by according exclusive
commercial rights to the contractor in situations where the contractor has an established non-
governmental commercial position .
Ill. Id.
112. See id. §§ 1(f), 4(g).
113. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
114. HARBRID)GE HOUSE, Govi'RNMENT PATENT PoeICY S-runy, FINAL REPORI F;OR THE
FCST ComMIrifE ON GOVERNMENT PATENT POIcy (1968) [hereinafter "HARBRIDGiE HOusE
REPORT"].
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patent title to NIH. Second, the Harbridge House Report recommended dif-
ferent rules for ownership of federally funded inventions for universities and
nonprofits on the one hand, and large private sector companies on the other.
In doing so, it revealed the roots of confusion over where universities and
nonprofits fit under the Kennedy Patent Policy by pointing to the language
requiring an "established commercial position" for title to lie in the contrac-
tor."5 It found that while large companies were likely to take on federal
contract research work even if the government retained title, universities and
nonprofits were not, because they could not directly commercialize the re-
sults through manufacture and distribution."'
Following the release of the Harbridge House Report-although not
necessarily because of it-the NIH changed its patent policy and instituted a
standard form "institutional patent agreement" ("IPA") for funding agree-
ments with universities that had an approved patent policy." The IPA gave
contractors the contractual right to elect to retain title. It also contained pro-
visions beyond those required under the Kennedy Patent Policy, including:
(i) a restriction against assignment of inventions to third parties except pri-
vate or university-affiliated patent management organizations such as Re-
search Corporation and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation; (ii) a
limitation on the term of exclusive licenses; (iii) a requirement for royalty
income to be shared with inventors, with any remaining funds (after ex-
penses) to be used for educational and research purposes; and (iv) a require-
ment that any patent application arising from the funding agreement contain
a reference to the government support."' Crucially, the IPA also required
contractors to obtain sufficient rights from its employees to protect the gov-
ernment's interests: "The Institution shall obtain patent agreements to effec-
tuate the provisions of this Agreement from all persons in its employ who
perform any part of the work under any contract except nontechnical person-
nel, such as clerical and manual laborers."' '9 The NIH IPA, together with the
later NSF IPA, would be explicitly acknowledged as the models for Bayh-
Dole.120
115. 4 HARBRIDGE HOUSE REPORT, supra nOte 114, at 93.
116. 1 HARBRIDGE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at vi.
117. See John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing-A New Twist
for March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUIER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 149, 153 (2005). The origins of the IPA concept dates back to 1953. See Gov't Patent
Policies: Institutional Patent Agreements: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Monopoly &
Anticompetitive Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 15 (1978) (statement
of Norman J. Latker, Patent Counsel, Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare).
118. See Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 117, at 153 n.16.
119. Gov't Patent Policies: Institutional Patent Agreements: Hearings Before the S. Sub-
comm. on Monopoly & Anticompetitive Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th
Cong. 1835 (1978) (minutes of meetings of interagency committees on revision of the draft of
the Government-wide IPA).
120. See 126 CONG. REc. 8714, 8737-49 (1980).
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C. The Nixon Patent Policy and GSA Regulations
In 1971 the Nixon administration issued a modified and restated version
of the Kennedy Patent Policy, which increased the opportunities for contrac-
tors to retain title or exclusive licenses (the "Nixon Patent Policy").12' Due to
the patent title allocation statutes that hindered the Kennedy administration,
the Nixon administration was likewise constrained in establishing a truly
uniform patent policy for the government. Notwithstanding this, President
Nixon ordered the General Services Administration ("GSA") to promulgate
implementing regulations for the Nixon Patent Policy.12 2
The GSA issued draft regulations in 1972,123 and then promulgated an
interim set of regulations in 1973.124 The heart of the regulations was a long
form 25 and short form 26 set of prescribed patent clauses to be included in
funding agreements (the "Patent Rights Clauses").127 The long form was to
be used with industry contractors and nonprofit contractors when develop-
ment work was to be performed. The short form could be used for basic and
applied research by nonprofit organizations. The long form had three varia-
tions for use: when the decision to allocate title was for the government,128
for the contractor,129 or to be deferred until actual inventions arose."o The
short form had two variations for use: when the decision to allocate title was
for the government'"' or was to be deferred until actual inventions arose.13 2
However, even where the government was to take title, the contractor
could petition to retain greater rights than the default nonexclusive license
("Greater Rights Determinations").'" While a process was established for a
contractor's employee to request retention of greater rights in the event that
the contractor did not seek them, with the contractor's consent, 3 4 the regula-
tions were clearly built upon the premise of employee ownership ab initio
because the Patent Rights Clauses required the contractor to secure sufficient
patent rights from employees to protect the government's interests: "The
Contractor shall obtain patent agreements to effectuate the provisions of this
121. Government Patent Policy: Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments &
Agencies, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (Aug. 23, 1971).
122. Id. § 2.
123. Allocation of Rights in Inventions, 38 Fed. Reg. 23782, 23791 (Sept. 4, 1973).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 1-9.107-5.
126. Id. § 1-9.107-6.
127. This set of clauses had origins in both the IPAs and earlier practice of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development from at least the 1940s. I Bimoon R31'oerT, supra note 3,
at 81-82.
128. Allocation of Rights in Inventions, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887, at § 1-9.107-5(a).
129. Id. § 1-9.107-5(b).
130. Id. § 1-9.107-5(c).
131. Id. § 1-9.107-6(a).
132. Id. § 1-9.107-6(b).
133. Id. § 1-9.109-6.
134. Id.
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clause from all persons in his employ who perform any part of the work
under this contract except nontechnical personnel, such as clerical employ-
ees and manual laborers."' 35
This backstop measure for employees to reacquire rights they had previ-
ously assigned to their employer in the event that neither the employer nor
the government were going to commercialize the invention was the model
for section 202(d) of Bayh-Dole.1 6 The problem was that the petition pro-
cess wound up in the statutory language of Bayh-Dole while the prior as-
signment requirement became buried in increasingly labyrinthine federal
regulations. This seems to have led directly to the confusion at the heart of
Stanford v. Roche: because the petition process seems to be the only way for
inventors to retain title, Bayh-Dole must have allocated title to the contractor
or government.' 7 The fault lies of course with the mistaken assumption of
assignments between contactors and their employees. The government need
not worry about how contractors were securing title from employees. It
could simply rely on them to do so. The Patent Rights Clauses were in place
to remind university administrators of this obligation.
In 1974, in Public Citizen v. Sampson, Public Citizen and a collection of
seventeen members of Congress challenged the regulations on the basis that
the regulations' authorization for federal agencies to grant title to contractors
harmed the plaintiffs as taxpayers (improper use of federal funds and prop-
erty), consumers (the contractors would have a monopoly position on feder-
ally funded inventions and charge higher than competitive prices to the
public), and members of Congress (the regulations usurped their constitu-
tional authority to determine the disposition of federal property).'13 This was
an attempt to bolster the Biddle Report's positions and revive dicta from
cases such as Squier and Houghton that the government should own inven-
tions it had funded. But those arguments had been rejected by the Supreme
Court in Dubilier and by a decade of formal executive policy over three
presidential administrations.
The Public Citizen court dismissed the case on motion of the defendant
after finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing to sue GSA because
they were not directly harmed by the regulations. While the court neither
ruled on the propriety of the Nixon Patent Policy and the promulgated regu-
lations, nor the merits of the plaintiffs' arguments, it noted in dicta that Con-
gress could act when it wanted to regulate the authority of federal agencies
in the disposition of patents that were federal property.139 The court declined,
in dicta, to suggest that federally funded inventions were necessarily federal
property. It did, however, state that if any such inventions were found to be
135. Id. §§ 1-9.107-5(a)-(c), 1-9.107-6(a)-(b).
136. See infra Part Ill.
137. See infra Part IV.
138. Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
139. Id. at 667 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2182, 2457 (1970)).
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federal property, then the agencies would not have the authority to assign
title in such patent property absent clear congressional authorization.'4
Notwithstanding the efforts of GSA to implement the title allocation
regulations and standard Patent Rights Clauses, in 1973 NSF developed and
began using its own IPA, substantially similar to that of NIH.141 Following
the resolution of Public Citizen, GSA reissued a revised final version of the
rules in 1975 (the "GSA Patent Policy Regulations").142 While there were
many specific textual changes, the overall contours, terminology, and
clauses of the GSA Patent Policy Regulations were quite similar to those of
the Interim GSA Patent Policy Regulations. These regulations remained in
place even after passage of Bayh-Dole, until final rulemaking was completed
in 1987 incorporating the Reagan Patent Policy, Reagan Executive Order,
and amendments to Bayh-Dole under the Trademark Clarification Act of
1984.143 They provided critical "infrastructure" clauses and terms as well as
the framework for understanding both the statutory provisions of Bayh-Dole
and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Thus, by the mid-1970s, intramural and extramural federal patent poli-
cies were fairly well developed. Federal employees generally had to assign
inventions arising from their work. Contractor employees were also gener-
ally assigning their inventions to the contractor. Relying on these general
contractor practices, the government did not dictate the terms of patent as-
signment agreements between contractors and their employees, but simply
required that an assignment sufficient to guarantee the government's rights
must be in place.'" At the same time, unless an IPA was in place, the inven-
tion title allocation as between the federal government and the contractor
was subject to the determination procedures of the Nixon Patent Policy, as
implemented in the GSA Patent Policy Regulations and standard Patent
Rights Clauses incorporated into the particular funding agreement.
III. BAYH-DOLE AND ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
In 1976, the Commission on Government Procurement appears to have
been the first government body to suggest a single patent ownership pol-
icy-there would be one set rule for determining whether title stayed with
140. Id. (citing Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1928)).
141. See Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 226, at 153.
142. Patents, Data & Copyrights: Allocation of Rights in Inventions, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,814
(May 7, 1975) (codified at 41 C.F.R. Part 1-9).
143. See infra Part IlI.
144. Patents, Data & Copyrights: Allocation of Rights in Inventions, 40 Fed. Reg.
19,814, at § 1-9.107-5 ("The Contractor shall obtain patent agreements to effectuate the provi-
sions of this clause from all persons in his employ who perform any part of the work under this
contract except nontechnical personnel, such as clerical workers and manual laborers."); id.
§ 1-9.107-6 ("[T]he Contractor shall ... obtain patent agreements to effectuate the provisions
of this clause from all persons who perform any part of the work under this contract except
nontechnical personnel, such as clerical employees and manual laborers.").
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the contractor or vested in the government.145 The Federal Council for Sci-
ence and Technology went further and drafted a bill.146 Although this bill
was not introduced into Congress, a similar bill was introduced in 1977.147
However, no hearings were held on the bill and it languished without ac-
tion.148 The following year, GSA announced that it would incorporate a
newly worded IPA in the Federal Procurement Regulations for government-
wide use by any agency not prohibited from doing so by statute. 4 9 This was
stayed while hearings on the nature and use of IPAs, including whether they
were properly authorized under Federal statutory law and the Nixon Patent
Policy, were held by the Senate Subcommittee on Monopoly and Anticom-
petitive Activities of the Select Committee on Small Business."'o
The Carter administration subsequently backed a new uniform govern-
ment patent policy'"' and was able to get a bill introduced to Congress in
1980.152 It envisioned a system of exclusive licenses limited to specific fields
of use that would be granted to federal contractors for inventions they devel-
oped under federal funding.153 If the contractor failed to commercialize the
invention within that field of use, then the government could terminate the
relevant license.15 4 At the same time, the bill supported the grant of title to
contractors who were universities or small businesses in recognition of their
"special place in our society." 5 5
This is where the confusion starts as to the "real" Bayh-Dole Act and its
legislative history. The statutory provisions we know as Bayh-Dole today
were ultimately signed into law as part of H.R. 6933, but this was only after
the text of S. 414 (the Senate bill that had been earlier introduced in 1979 by
Senators Birch Bayh and Robert Dole) was used to replace all of the relevant
original text of H.R. 6933 in an amendment-by-substitution legislative pro-
145. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC & INT'L SCH-NTwFIC PLANNING & ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON Sci. & TECH., 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON Gov'T PATENT PoLIcIus:
REP. OF COMMS., COMM'NS., AND MAJOR STUDIES 185, 195 (Comm. Print 1976).
146. FED. COUNCIL FOR SC. & TECH., COMM. ON Gov'r PATENT Pol-icy, Draft Bill
Entitled "Federal Intellectual Property Policy Act of 1976," reprinted in 1976 FED. COUNCIL
FOR SCI. & TECH., COMBINED REPORT ON Gov'T PATENT Poticy 82-119 app. D.
147. H.R. 6249, 95th Cong. (1977).
148. See University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S. 414
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 51 (1979).
149. Federal Procurement Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 4424 (Feb. 2, 1978).
150. Gov't Patent Policies: Institutional Patent Agreements, Hearings before the S. Sub-
comm. on Monopoly & Anticompetitive Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th
Cong. 1-12 (1978).
151. Industrial Innovation Initiatives: Message to Cong. on Admin. Actions & Proposals,
2 PuB. PAPERS 2070, 2071 (Oct. 31, 1979).
152. Bill to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, H.R. 6933, 96th Cong. § 6 (as intro-
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cedure.1 6 Sections I through 5 of the original H.R. 6933 were various
amendments to the patent and trademark laws relating to things such as reex-
amination proceedings and fees and funding for the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("USPTO"). 5 They had nothing to do with disposition of
federally owned or funded inventions. Section 6 contained the bill's provi-
sions for a new Chapter 38 in Title 35 (Patents) of the U.S. Code that would
codify "The Government Patent Policy Act of 1980."118
S. 414-the actual statutory provisions that became the Bayh-Dole
Act-had been introduced as the University and Small Business Patent Pro-
cedures Act on February 9, 1979 and referred to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary Committee.'5 9 S. 414 avoided many of the controversies plagu-
ing other government patent policy bills by covering only nonprofit, univer-
sity, and small business contractors. The retention of federally funded patent
rights by large business federal contractors had been a lightning rod for com-
mentators concerned with unjust windfalls and monopolies for such busi-
nesses. The provisions of S. 414 clearly derived from the Nixon Patent
Policy, the GSA Patent Policy Regulations, and IPAs, but with some slightly
different language in parts, and were to be codified as a new Chapter 18 in
Title 35 (Patents) of the U.S. Code.' 60
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on S. 414 in late
1979 and issued a report-Senate Report No. 96-480-which is the only
published congressional report that comments on the actual language of
Bayh-Dole.' 6' The bill was reintroduced and after some debate the Senate
passed S. 414 on April 23, 1980.162 The bill was defeated, however, after
being introduced as H.R. 2414 in the House of Representatives. Instead, the
House passed the Carter administration's favored H.R. 6933 bill on Novem-
ber 17, 1980, which then advanced to the Senate. The Senate amended H.R.
6933 by substituting in the entirety the provisions of its own S. 414 for all of
156. See H.R. 6933, Amendment SU 1779, 96th Cong. (Nov. 20, 1980) (proposed by
Senator Dole and agreed to by a Senate voice vote).
157. H.R. 6933, 96th Cong. §§ 1-5 (as introduced in House, Mar. 26, 1980).
158. Id. § 6.
159. University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, S. 414, 96th Cong. (as intro-
duced in Senate, Feb. 9, 1979).
160. Id.
161. S. REP. No. 96-480 (1979). Hearings and reports for H.R. 6933 and any other bills
in Congress during the years 1978-1980 are directed to substantially different bills that did not
have the provisions of S. 414 (Bayh-Dole). Some commentators have inaccurately relied on
congressional reports or debates that were directed to the original H.R. 6933, when discussing
Bayh-Dole. See, e.g., Birch Bayh & Robert Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs
Sooner, WASH. PosT, Apr. I1, 2002, at A28; Sen. Birch Bayh, Statement to Nat'l Inst. Of
Health (May 25, 2004), in NAT'L INST. OF HEALrn, PuIueIC MEETING ON NORVIR/RrroNAvIR
MARCH-IN RiEQuE.S-T (2004), available at http://ott.cit.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
pdfs/2004NorvirMtg.pdf.
162. 126 CONG. REc. 8731, 8737-49 (1980).
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section 6 in H.R. 6933 (leaving sections 1-5 intact),'63 passed the bill on
November 20, 1980, and then returned the amended H.R. 6933 to the
House.'" Thus, only debate occurring in the Senate on H.R. 6933 after the
provisions of S. 414 were added to the bill in the amendment-by-substitution
process should be considered as congressional views on the actual text of
Bayh-Dole. Due to the pressing nature of the provisions of sections 1-5 of
H.R. 6933, the House essentially capitulated on the battle over the content of
section 6 and passed the Senate's amended version with little discussion, and
with no further amendments, the next day.165 The House viewed the Senate's
section 6 (Bayh-Dole) as incomplete because members of the House had
wanted to pass a truly uniform government patent policy that would cover
all contractors, not just small businesses and universities. 66 However, the
House contented itself with resolving to revisit the issue in the next
Congress.'16
The bill was signed into law as simply "An Act to Amend the Patent and
Trademark Laws" on December 12, 1980.168 Section 6 of H.R. 6933 then
became what is today referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act. The Bayh-Dole Act
created 35 U.S.C. § 200 to set out its purpose.' 69 Section 201 set out defini-
tions that in all cases mapped directly from definitions found in the Kennedy
Patent Policy, Nixon Patent Policy, or GSA Patent Policy Regulations.17
Section 202 set out the basic right of contractors to elect to take title, and the
conditions attendant thereto.'' This section included the Government Li-
cense, disclosure, and utilization reporting requirements that all also tracked
the existing Executive Branch policies and regulations. Section 203 estab-
lished the March-in Rights provisions, again taken directly from existing
Executive Branch policies.172 Section 204 set out the preference for U.S.
163. H.R. 6933, Amendment SU 1779, 96th Cong. (Nov. 20, 1980) (proposed by Senator
Dole and agreed to by Voice Vote of Senate). Section 6 retained the codification at Chapter 38,
but now had the title "Patent Rights in Inventions Made With Federal Assistance."
164. 126 CONG. RiEc. 30360-66 (1980).
165. 126 CONG. Rvc. 30556-60 (Nov. 21, 1980). Representative Kastenmeier's com-
ments on introducing and urging passage of the Senate amendments to H.R. 6933 are illumi-
nating for context: "[T]he bill we passed on Monday ... is intact except for section 6.... In
essence, the Senate deleted that section. I regret that action, but nonetheless it is a fact, and the
outlook is virtually nonexistent for anything we can do in that regard .. .. Under the circum-
stances, I would say ... that we will have to wait until next year to pursue again the uniform
patent policy section, and I would join ... in doing that. But in the meantime, rather than hold
hostage these noncontroversial areas, I think we have no real option but to move forward with
this and send it to the White House." Id. at 30560.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6, 94 Stat.
3015 (1980).
169. Id. § 6(a)(200).
170. Id. § 6(a)(201).
171. Id. § 6(a)(202).
172. Id. § 6(a)(203).
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industry that contractors should exercise when licensing subject inventions
for commercialization.7 3 This provision underscored the understanding that
contractors affected by Bayh-Dole would generally be licensing out their
subject inventions, not directly practicing them. Section 205 provided for
confidential treatment of information and data obtained from contractors
pursuant to invention disclosures (confidential treatment for utilization re-
ports was established in section 202).174 Section 206 authorized the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy ("OFPP") to promulgate regulations implement-
ing sections 202-204.17
The next few sections applied to federally owned rather than federally
funded inventions.'7 6 But section 210 provided one of the key breakthroughs
of Bayh-Dole: it superseded the myriad title allocation that Congress had
passed over the years in the case of nonprofit, university, and small business
contractors operating under funding agreements controlled by Bayh-Dole.'77
Had even this one statutory provision been in place for the Kennedy or
Nixon administrations, govermment patent policy and technology transfer
might have developed far more effectively in the pre-Bayh-Dole decades.
Section 210 also made it clear that the bill did not supersede these title allo-
cation rules for any other contractors. It then ratified and authorized the title
allocation rules-both extant and in the future-under the Nixon Patent Pol-
icy or any successor policy for such contractors. Finally, section 211 ex-
pressly disclaimed any immunity from the antitrust laws for contractors by
virtue of the bill's provisions. 78
Bayh-Dole's provisions became effective on July 1, 1981, with the
OFPP authorized to promulgate implementing regulations at any time after
receipt of recommendations from the Office of Science and Technology Pol-
icy ("OSTP"). As a sub-agency of the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB"), OFPP issued interim final regulations as OMB Bulletin 81-22 on
June 30, 1981.19 The regulations became effective July 1, 1981-to match
up with Bayh-Dole's effective date-and were to expire on December 31,
1981, when replaced by a final OMB Circular.
Substantively, Bulletin 81-22 followed the same terminology and essen-
tial concepts of the Nixon Patent Policy and GSA Patent Policy Regulations,
except of course as limited to the "retention by the contractor" long form
173. Id. § 6(a)(204).
174. Id. § 6(a)(205).
175. Id. § 6(a)(206).
176. Section 207 authorized federal agencies to patent and license their federally owned
inventions. Id. § 6(a)(207). Section 208 authorized GSA to promulgate rules governing the
licensing of federally owned inventions. Id. § 6(a)(208). Section 209 established restrictions
on the licensing of federally owned inventions. Id. § 6(a)(209).
177. Id. at § 6(a)(210).
178. Id. at § 6(a)(21 1).
179. Patents; Small Business Firms & Non-Profit Organizations, 46 Fed. Reg. 34,776
(July 2, 1981).
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version of the Patent Rights Clauses in the GSA Patent Policy Regulations.
However, the version of the Patent Rights Clauses in Bulletin 81-22 used a
substantively different "practical application" definition that focused on hav-
ing the benefits of the subject invention "available to the public on reasona-
ble terms." This was in contrast to the definition in the GSA Patent Policy
Regulations, which focused on having the benefits of the subject invention
"reasonably accessible to the public." However, as discussed above, this was
likely because the core provisions of Bayh-Dole were limited to nonprofit
organizations and small businesses which would generally be expected to
license out their inventions for widespread commercialization rather than
commercialize the inventions themselves. Accordingly, Bayh-Dole and its
regulatory implementation appear to have simply adopted a modified version
of the licensing oriented phrase "available for licensing royalty free or on
terms that are reasonable in the circumstances" that originated in the Ken-
nedy Patent Policy and had remained in continuous use since then to signify
the licensing restriction.
The continuity of other requirements from the GSA Patent Policy Regu-
lations to Bulletin 81-22 that were not actually required under Bayh-Dole
belies the conservative nature of the federal patent policy process at the reg-
ulatory level. For example, Bayh-Dole as enacted only required that contrac-
tors disclose a subject invention "within a reasonable time after it is made,"
while Bulletin 81-22 required contractors to disclose a subject invention
within six months after the contractor's personnel in charge of patent matters
were notified by the inventors about the subject invention. This time restric-
tion followed directly from the same time restriction in the GSA Patent Pol-
icy Regulations, albeit with a modified trigger.s 0
Other time requirements in Bulletin 81-22 were changed from those
contained in the GSA Patent Policy Regulations. However, few if any of
these changes appear to have been drafted specifically because of the lan-
guage or intent of Bayh-Dole. Rather, they seem to be simply further steps in
the continuing evolution of the government's patent policy, and thus repre-
sented a tightening up of certain requirements based on new experiences.
For example, in the GSA Patent Policy Regulations, contractors had to elect
to retain title to subject inventions (in cases where the federal agency had
used the "retention by contractor" patent clause in the funding agreement) at
the time of disclosing the subject invention to the funding agency. But in
Bulletin 81-22, contractors could wait up to twelve months to elect to retain
title from the date that their patent administrators learned of the invention,
180. In the GSA Patent Policy Regulations, the trigger was the conception or actual re-
duction to practice of the subject invention. Whereas in Bulletin 81-22, it was the date of
notification of the conception or actual reduction to practice from the inventors to the contrac-
tor's patent administrators.
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whereas they had to disclose the subject invention to the funding agency
within six months of that date.
Bulletin 81-22's sunset date was extended twice: first to January 31,
1982,1'1 and then to February 28, 1982.182 The final OMB rule, OMB Circu-
lar A-124, implemented Bayh-Dole as enacted, and was published on Febru-
ary 19, 1982. It became effective March I that year.8 3 While many
comments had been received by OFPP during the rulemaking process, Cir-
cular A-124 was substantially the same as Bulletin 81-22.
Despite Congress's sidestepping of the large business contractor issue in
Bayh-Dole, there was still a desire in some parts of the government to ex-
tend the default rule for contractor title elections to large businesses. At the
same time, the clarity of Bayh-Dole's one-size-fits-all rule was muddied by
the uncertainty as to which companies would be deemed too large to fall
within the Act's ambit. Accordingly, in 1983, President Reagan replaced the
Nixon Patent Policy with his own that adopted the rules and policies of
Bayh-Dole to become the new federal patent policy covering all contractors
who fell outside of the scope of Bayh-Dole (the "Reagan Patent Policy").18 4
This essentially unified federal patent policy across all federal contractors,
subject to some technical distinctions.
The following year, Congress amended Bayh-Dole as part of the Trade-
mark Clarification Act of 1984.185 One amendment, in particular, has been
controversial. Section 210(c) was modified to acknowledge the new Reagan
Patent Policy and to require that the Executive Branch policy, which was
promulgated for federal contractors and was not directly covered by Bayh-
Dole, impose at a minimum the Government License and March-In Rights
through funding agreements.'8 6 By contrast, the Reagan Patent Policy had
permitted agencies to use their discretion to waive any Bayh-Dole provi-
sions, where necessary to secure contractor participation and commercializa-
tion of any resultant subject inventions. While the amendment of section
210(c) may appear to have been an "endorsement" or "authorization" of the
Reagan Patent Policy by Congress that effectively extended Bayh-Dole to
cover large businesses, such an interpretation is not directly supported by the
legislative history. Instead, the section likely maintained its earlier purpose
to authorize the executive to make policy for contractors not directly covered
181. 47 Fed. Reg. 117 (Jan. 4, 1982).
182. 47 Fed. Reg. 4628 (Feb. 1, 1982).
183. 47 Fed. Reg. 7556 (Feb. 19, 1982).
184. Memorandum to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRss.
Doc. 252 (Feb. 18, 1983).
185. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335. There were
also minor amendments to Bayh-Dole in 1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-256, tit. I, §§ 101(5)-(6),
102, 96 Stat. 816 (1982).
186. See S. Rip. No. 98-662, at 5808 (1984).
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by Bayh-Dole. The new twist, however, was that such policy had to include
a version of the Government License and March-in Rights.
The Trademark Clarification Act of 1984 also amended Bayh-Dole to
substitute the Department of Commerce ("DoC") for OFPP for rulemaking
authority.'8 7 DoC began a rulemaking process in 1985 to implement all of
the 1984 amendments in a new Chapter IV in Title 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations ("CFR") consisting of a new part 401.188 The proposed rules
closely followed Circular A-124 with changes primarily to effect the statu-
tory amendments. The next year, DoC issued an Interim Final Rule that in-
cluded further minor modifications based on public and agency comments
on the proposed rule.'89 Then on March 18, 1987, DoC published the final
rule implementing Bayh-Dole as amended (the "Bayh-Dole Regulations"),
to become effective on April 17, 1987.9o This contained only minor revi-
sions as well. In some ways, then, Bayh-Dole only became fully imple-
mented in 1987, after all of the issues raised by the Reagan Patent Policy and
1984 amendments were finalized and implemented through rule making.
Following a matter of days after the effective date of the Bayh-Dole
Regulations, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12591, "Facilitating
Access to Science and Technology" ("1987 Reagan Executive Order").'9'
This Executive Order conformed Executive Branch technology and patent
policy to both the recently enacted Federal Technology Transfer Act' 92 and
Bayh-Dole amendments in the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984. It also
incorporated the Bayh-Dole Regulations as references for patent allocation
under the Federal Acquisition Regulations for large businesses not directly
covered by Bayh-Dole.193
The interim rulemakings and Bayh-Dole Regulations broadly tracked
the earlier GSA regulations, creating a chain of continuity in the basic ad-
ministration and content of the federal R&D procurement system, even for
provisions not expressly required by Bayh-Dole, and including the
mandatory standard Patent Rights Clauses. Within the latter, the Bayh-Dole
187. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, § 501(4), Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335
(1984).
188. Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations & Small Business Firms, 50
Fed. Reg. 13524 (Apr. 4, 1985).
189. Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations & Small Business Firms, 51
Fed. Reg. 25508 (July 14, 1986).
190. Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations & Small Business Firms, 52
Fed. Reg. 8552 (Mar. 18, 1987).
191. Facilitating Access to Science & Technology, Exec. Order No. 12591, 52 Fed. Reg.
13414 (Apr. 22, 1987).
192. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 9(c), 100 Stat.
1785.
193. The implementing rules for the Reagan Patent Policy continue to be codified in
FAR Subpart 27.3. The switch from the Federal Procurement Regulation system ("FPR") to
the Federal Acquisition Regulation system ("FAR") was effected in 1983. See Final Rule,
Establishing the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 42102 (Sept. 19, 1983).
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Regulations also continued a modified version of the Final GSA Regula-
tions' explicit requirement for contractors to secure patent rights from em-
ployee-inventors: "The contractor agrees to require, by written agreement,
its employees, other than clerical and nontechnical employees . .. to execute
all papers necessary to file patent applications on subject inventions and to
establish the government's rights in the subject inventions."l 94
Both prongs of this contractual requirement would be unnecessary if
Bayh-Dole automatically vested title to the invention in the contractor by
operation of law. The contractor would not even have to obtain the assent or
participation of the inventor, as it could file the patent application under the
"hostile inventor" provision of the Patent Act.'19 Even if the first prong were
read simply as a means to smooth the path for perfecting and recording title
assignment with the USPTO, this would not explain the presence of the sec-
ond prong. Written agreements with employee-inventors to protect the gov-
ernment's rights in such inventions would be entirely superfluous if Bayh-
Dole vested title in the contractor by operation of law. Accordingly, even
where there is a reference in Senate Report 96-480 that mentions the Act
"automatically" granting title to small businesses and nonprofits, 9 6 this
comment was actually directed to the fact that the Act was intended to
change the existing ex post determination of title allocation as between con-
tractor and federal agency into an ex ante system in which the allocation was
predetermined under the funding agreement (and hence was "automatic").
Between 1984 and 2000, only minor conforming and typographical cor-
rection amendments were made to Bayh-Dole.'"9 In 2000, substantive
changes were made to Bayh-Dole primarily in sections dealing with feder-
ally owned inventions. 98 However section 200, "Policy and objective," was
also amended to change a key clause from "to ensure that inventions made
by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to
promote free competition and enterprise;" to "to ensure that inventions made
by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to
promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future
194. 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.14(a), (f)(2) (2012) (second emphasis added).
195. "Whenever an inventor refuses to execute an application for patent, or cannot be
found or reached after diligent effort, a person to whom the inventor has assigned or agreed in
writing to assign the invention or who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the
matter justifying such action, may make application for patent on behalf of and as agent for the
inventor on proof of the pertinent facts and a showing that such action is necessary to preserve
the rights of the parties or to prevent irreparable damage . . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 118 (2011).
196. S. Rip. No. 96-480, at 36 (1979).
197. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); Pub. L. No. 102-204, 105 Stat. 1636
(1991); Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992); Pub.L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745
(1994); Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996); Pub. L. No. 105-393, 112 Stat. 3596
(1998); and Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
198. Pub. L. No. 106-404, 114 Stat. 1742 (2000).
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research and discovery." 99 No other substantive changes have been made to
date. 200
IV. RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF CONTRACTOR TITLE
To EMPLOYEE INVENTIONS
Long after the Biddle Report had faded from view, and after decades of
having the question of assignments between contractors and employees bur-
ied in bureaucratic regulations, the mistaken assumption of universal assign-
ments burst back into view in the 1990s and 2000s. Possibly in part because
nothing in the Patent Rights Clauses expressly requires the contractor to
have a full patent assignment agreement in place with all inventive employ-
ees, some universities began assuming that Bayh-Dole obligated a contrac-
tor's employees to assign subject inventions by act of law so long as the
university timely elected to retain title. 20 1 Some universities developed prac-
tices whereby they only bound their inventor employees to agree to assign
inventions when they arose and upon request of the university.2 02 In some
cases this was done in a specific employment agreement, offer letter, or sep-
arate patent assignment agreement. 203 In other cases it was done through
faculty handbooks or other official statements of policy. 204
However, neither of these paths secure the assignment of inventions to
the university at the time of execution of the agreement, date of hire, or date
of issuance of the policy, as applicable. At most, they secure a contractual
obligation for the inventor to assign the invention at some later date, as a
kind of call option. But some universities and nonprofit organizations also
sought to exercise their "statutory right" under Bayh-Dole to take title from
employees even where no express agreement was in place with the employee
by electing title to the invention with the funding agency. 205
Even before Stanford v. Roche, this interpretation had been rejected by
federal district courts. In Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Center for Neurologic Study, the
Center raised counterclaims based on Dr. David Kohne's work as a principal
199. Id.
200. In 2002, typographic formatting errors in Sections 202 and 203 were fixed and stat-
utory citation conforming amendments for Sections 201, 209, and 210 were made. Pub. L. No.
107-273 (2002). And finally, in 2005 the last Bayh-Dole amendment to date was another
statutory citation conforming amendments for section 210. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
(2005).
201. See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131
S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
202. See e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Townsend,
No. 3:04-cv-291, 2007 WL 2263079, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 542
F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2008).
203. See, e.g., Stanford, 583 F.3d at 837.
204. See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh, 2007 WL 2263079, at *1.
205. See, e.g., id.; Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Ctr. for Neurologic Study, 853 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.
Cal. 1993).
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investigator for grants the Center had received from federal agencies. 206 In
particular, the Center alleged that Kohne had conceived subject inventions
under the grants and had then refused to assign them to the Center, even
after the Center timely elected title with the funding agency. 207 The Center
sought assignment of the inventions. However, the court found that Kohne
was not a party to the funding agreements-his listing as principal investiga-
tor did not make him a party-and that there was apparently no agreement
between him and the Center. 208 Further, the court cited the Patent Rights
Clause in the Final Bayh-Dole Regulations to support the proposition that
"[i]f Dr. Kohne, and employees like him, were automatically parties to fed-
eral funding agreements, that requirement [of written agreements] would be
superfluous." 209
In University of Pittsburgh v. Townsend, the University of Pittsburgh
("Pitt") alleged that David Townsend and others had subverted and misap-
propriated Pitt's rights to certain patents. 2 11 Pitt relied on its Faculty Hand-
book and other policies that purported to effect an assignment obligation on
faculty researchers. 2 11 However, by its own terms, the policy was not to be
relied on by faculty as Pitt's definitive policies.2 12 Townsend had made Pitt
aware of his outside consulting with a private firm.2 1 After working on two
NIH grants while at Pitt, Townsend disclosed his inventions on the appropri-
ate Pitt form, but did not include an assignment. 214 Pitt's technology transfer
personnel processed the disclosure but never followed up with Townsend for
the assignment. 215 Pitt entered into a collaboration agreement with Town-
send's outside consulting firm. 2 16 Meanwhile, Townsend pursued a patent
application on his invention with his consulting firm listed as assignee. 2 17
As one of its arguments in litigation, Pitt asserted that Bayh-Dole oper-
ated to assign title from Townsend to Pitt once the latter elected to take title
with the funding agency. 218 It cited the district court opinion in Stanford v.
Roche which found that Bayh-Dole had indeed vested title in Stanford. 219
But the Townsend court found this unpersuasive as the Stanford researcher
had already executed at least an express agreement to assign his invention to
206. Gen-Probe, 853 F. Supp. at 1217.
207. Id. at 1218.
208. Id. at 1218-19.
209. Id. at 1219.
210. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 2007 WL 2263079, at *1.
211. Id. at *2-3.
212. Id. at *4.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *8.
215. Id. at *8-9.
216. Id. at *9.
217. Id. at *10-1 l.
218. Id. at *20.
219. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of Leland Standford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1115, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
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Stanford before executing the assignment agreement with Roche's predeces-
sor, Cetus.22 0 Further, Pitt had full knowledge of Townsend's inventions and
work with his consulting firm, and still failed to secure any kind of assign-
ment agreement from him. 22 1
In the reverse direction, John Fenn, a Nobel laureate researcher at Yale
University, tried to invoke section 202(d) of Bayh-Dole to claim that it
trumped any contractual arrangements between inventors and their employ-
ers because only the federal funding agency has the authority to decide dis-
puted ownership of subject inventions. 222 The District Court for the District
of Connecticut found that Fenn's attempts to portray Yale as having made a
decision to allow him to retain title to his invention in correspondence with
the NIH were unsuccessful because Yale officials had already elected to
retain title.223 It also found that Bayh-Dole did not preempt state law contrac-
tual rights in this matter. 224
Finally, in Stanford v. Roche, the Supreme Court squarely rejected an
interpretation of Bayh-Dole as a vesting statute that would assign title to
contractors from their employees by act of law. 2 25 Dr. Mark Holodniy be-
came a research fellow at Stanford University in 1988.226 He executed Stan-
ford's then standard Copyright and Patent Agreement ("CPA") which
provided that he "'agree[d] to assign' to Stanford his 'right, title, and interest
in' inventions resulting from his employment" at Stanford.227 His work re-
quired him to learn and use the polymerase chain reaction technique
("PCR") that Cetus Corporation had pioneered and his supervisor arranged
for him to learn. Upon arriving at Cetus, Holodniy executed Cetus' Visitor's
Confidentiality Agreement ("VCA"), which provided that he "'will assign
and do[es] hereby assign' to Cetus his 'right, title and interest in each of the
ideas, inventions and improvements' made 'as a consequence of [his] ac-
cess' to Cetus." 228
After nine months, during which the invention at the heart of this case
was conceived, Holodniy returned to Stanford to test and refine the inven-
tion. He worked with colleagues there, allegedly with federal funding.229 In
1991, Roche purchased all of Cetus' PCR-related assets. Over the next few
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140-41 (D. Conn. 2004).
223. Id. at 139.
224. Id. at 140-42.
225. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188 (2011).
226. Id. at 2192; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
227. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2192; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 838. Stanford was never able to produce the
government funding agreement.
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years it developed and distributed commercial kits worldwide based in part
on Holodniy's work at Cetus.2 30 In 1992, Holodniy and his Stanford col-
leagues finished testing and refining the invention. Stanford then obtained
invention assignments from them and filed patent applications on the tech-
nique. 231 Three patents ultimately issued. 23 2 In 2000, Stanford approached
Roche about taking a license to the Holodniy patents, but Roche declined
after responding that it was a co-owner or licensee of the inventions based
upon the terms of the VCA, some materials transfer agreements, and under
common law shop rights. 233 Stanford sued Roche for patent infringement in
2005.234
The district court erroneously resolved the case largely in Stanford's
favor by relying on the provisions of Bayh-Dole to transfer title by operation
of law.23 5 It also did not mention the first-in-time CPA, and instead treated
an earlier materials transfer agreement and the VCA as the governing con-
tracts. 23 6 The court found that the invention had been conceived by Holodniy
while he was working at Cetus, and that, based on the terms of the VCA, he
had preassigned his rights in it to Cetus. 23 7 Notwithstanding this assignment,
once Holodniy returned to Stanford, his work to reduce it to practice under
federal funding triggered the provisions of Bayh-Dole.238 Under the court's
interpretation of Bayh-Dole's section 202(d), the government has a "first
right of refusal" to subject inventions (which include inventions first con-
ceived or actually reduced to practice under federal funding), the contractor
has a "second right of refusal," and then the inventor has only the remaining
residual rights to petition for title. 239 Because Stanford timely elected to take
title, the court concluded that the statutory provisions of Bayh-Dole super-
seded Roche first-in-time contractual assignment rights.24 0
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's Bayh-Dole holding by
rejecting the district court's "right of second refusal" theory for contrac-
tors.24 1 It also discussed the role of the CPA, which Stanford now seemed to
be relying on as an alternate avenue to cut off the effectiveness of the
VCA. 242 The court distinguished present assignments of expectant interests
230. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192.
231. Id. at 2192; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 838.
232. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 838.
233. Stanford, 583 F.3d at 838.
234. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2193.
235. See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 487
F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1117-19 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
236. Id. at 1115-17, 1120-23.
237. Id. at 1115-17.
238. Id. at 1117-19.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
242. Id. at 841-42.
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from mere promises to assign rights to the expectant interests in the future. 243
Relying on its precedents, the court asserted that present assignment of ex-
pectant interests-rights to property that do not yet exist-are valid, but
establish only equitable title until the invention is actually made and a patent
application filed.244 However, immediately upon the filing of a patent appli-
cation, legal title to the patent rights vest in the assignee with no further
action required. 245
Such present assignments of expectant interests must be distinguished
from mere promises to assign rights in the future. 24 6 The latter are often used
when the prospective assignee does not know in advance whether it wants
title to the future invention and thus instead establishes what is essentially a
call option. The two forms can both be contractual, but the present assign-
ment is established by language such as "hereby assign," whereas the prom-
ise to assign is established by a phrase such as "agree to assign." 247 In
contrast to the present assignment of expectant interests, when a promise to
assign is made, and a patent application is later filed, no transfer of title
occurs until and unless the option is called. 24 8 In the meantime, the inventor
may legally assign any of her rights to third parties. 249 Of course, if and
when the holder of the call option calls it in, then the assignor will not be
able to honor that option and convey the invention rights (unless she can
reacquire them from the current assignee). At this point, she would be in
breach of her option agreement. But the counterparty to that agreement
would only be able to sue for contract damages and not for an equitable
remedy that would require conveyance of the inventions rights.
After establishing superior equitable title in Roche, the Federal Circuit
then proceeded to reject the lower court's interpretation of Bayh-Dole. It
found that the district court had misinterpreted a Federal Circuit precedent
which ruled that some violations of Bayh-Dole could allow the government
to void title held by contractors or their employees. 25 0 However, such viola-
tions did not void title ab initio and thus the government would have to act
to void title.25 1 Most importantly, the Federal Circuit overturned the district
court's ruling and disputed Stanford's position that the inventor residual title






248. Id. at 841.
249. Id. at 842.
250. Id. at 844.
251. Id. By contrast, the district court had held that such actions were automatically void.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1118-19 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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Stanford identifies no authorities or reasons why its election of title
under Bayh-Dole had the power to void any prior, otherwise valid
assignments of patent rights. Stanford was entitled to claim
whatever rights were still available after the Government declined
to exercise its option, including the rights of co-inventors Merigan,
Katzenstein, and Kozal. However, Holodniy transferred his rights to
Cetus more than six years before Stanford formally notified the
Government of its election of title. As previously noted, Stanford's
invention rights policy "allow[ed] all rights to remain with the in-
ventor if possible," . . . which supports the conclusion that Holodniy
still possessed rights at the time he signed the VCA with Cetus. Just
as we explained that Bayh-Dole does not automatically void ab ini-
tio the inventors' rights in government-funded inventions, . . . we
see no reason why the Act voids prior contractual transfers of
rights.252
The Federal Circuit cited Townsend with approval for its proposition
that later elections of title under Bayh-Dole by a university do not void ear-
lier valid assignments from the inventor to a third party. 253 It then adopted
the Fenn court's interpretation that "'the primary purpose of the Bayh-Dole
Act is to regulate relationships of small business and nonprofit grantees with
the Government, not between grantees and the inventors who work for
them.'"254
Thus, the Federal Circuit laid bare the incorrect reading of Bayh-Dole
on which many universities had built their IP and technology transfer poli-
cies. Whereas Bayh-Dole was itself built on the mistaken assumption that all
contractors were requiring assignments-and likely present assignments at
that-from all inventive employees, this crucial link in the chain of title may
never have been secured by universities and was certainly later lost in the
translation of decades of government patent policy. But universities, which
had widely varying policies as to requiring assignment of inventions from
faculty, seemed to welcome Bayh-Dole in part as a backstop to secure title
by operation of law for federally funded inventions. This allowed "faculty
rights friendly" universities such as Stanford to have it both ways. They
could set up formal IP policies to "allow all rights to remain with the inven-
tor if possible," while relying on Bayh-Dole's provisions to transfer title to
them by operation of law for federally funded inventions. Further exacerbat-
ing the matter was the subsuming of the obligations for contractors to secure
necessary rights from employees into the GSA and Bayh-Dole regulations. It
did not help matters that these regulations were difficult to decipher without
knowledge of their purpose or history. Some universities appeared to read
252. Stanford, 583 F.3d at 844.
253. Id. at 845.
254. Id. (quoting Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 141-42 (D. Conn. 2004)).
417Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:379
them as simply requiring after-the-fact formal assignments as a technicality
to help the university or government perfect title in the invention with the
PTO.
Stanford petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on the Bayh-Dole
issue only with the following question:
Whether a federal contractor university's statutory right under the
Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212, in inventions arising from
federally funded research can be terminated unilaterally by an indi-
vidual inventor through a separate agreement purporting to assign
the inventor's rights to a third party. 255
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Federal Circuit.
In particular, it reaffirmed its earlier holdings that rights in an invention
belong to the inventor, absent some express transfer between the inventor
and his employer or another.256 It rejected Stanford's argument that Bayh-
Dole is a "vesting statute" similar to the Atomic Energy Act, in which title to
relevant inventions is vested in designated agencies by act of law. 257 The
Court then focused on the definition under Bayh-Dole which requires that a
"subject invention" be an "invention of the contractor."258 Under the major-
ity's view, the emphasized portion would be superfluous if any invention
arising under federal funding were subject to Bayh-Dole. 259 Instead, the
Court held that a subject invention is one to which the contractor lawfully
has rights or title.260
Most importantly, the Court found that the title-allocation scheme under
section 202(d), which leaves the inventor with only a conditioned residual
interest, applies only to subject inventions (i.e., those to which the contractor
has already obtained title).26 1 In other words, the contractor has to first ob-
tain rights to inventions created by its employees, and then if federal funding
is used in the conception or actual reduction to practice of these inventions,
the scheme of section 202(d) controls. Thus, just as its predecessor in the
GSA regulations had done, section 202(d) operates as a control mechanism
for inventors who have already assigned their inventions to the contractor. If
the contractor and government later fail to elect title as between them, and
thus imply that they have no interest in bringing the invention to practical
255. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (No. 09-1159) (mem.), 2010 WL 1138571,
at *i.
256. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011).
257. Id. at 2195-96.
258. Id. at 2196 (emphasis added).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2197-98.
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application, then the inventor can petition to get her rights back so that she
can commercialize the invention. This of course is entirely consistent with
the deep history developed in this article and the mistaken assumption upon
which government patent policy, including Bayh-Dole, has been based since
the Biddle Report. 26 2
Ironically, the Court concluded by effectively updating the Biddle Re-
port's faulty conclusion for the twenty-first century:
Though unnecessary to our conclusion, it is worth noting that our
construction of the Bayh-Dole Act is reflected in the common prac-
tice among parties operating under the Act. Contractors generally
institute policies to obtain assignments from their employees . . . .
As just noted, universities typically enter into agreements with their
employees requiring the assignment to the university of rights in
inventions. 263
But Stanford was not an anomaly in its assignment policy and CPA
form. Many other universities used "promise to assign" language, and some,
like Pitt, were relying on policies in nonbinding faculty handbooks to im-
pose the assignment obligation. The Court was thus more accurate when it
cited federal agency requirements for contractors to secure assignments from
employees:
Agencies that grant funds to federal contractors typically expect
those contractors to obtain assignments. So it is with NIH, the
agency that granted the federal funds at issue in this case. In gui-
dance documents made available to contractors, NIH made clear
that "[b]y law, an inventor has initial ownership of an invention"
and that contractors should therefore "have in place employee
agreements requiring an inventor to 'assign' or give ownership of
an invention to the organization upon acceptance of Federal
funds." . . . Such guidance would be unnecessary if Stanford's read-
ing of the statute were correct.2 6
However, even this assessment is not quite right. First, the Court should
have located and cited the Bayh-Dole regulation that requires contractors to
obtain written agreements from their employees to protect the government's
interest. As discussed above, this neither necessarily requires a present as-
signment of expectant interests, nor even clearly tells contractors to obtain a
262. The Author wrote the Supreme Court amicus brief submitted by AIPLA in Stanford
which placed a version of this history and the requirement for contractor to secure assignment
from inventors before the Court. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n in
Support of Neither Party, Stanford, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (No. 09-1159), 2010 WL 5312674.
263. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2199 (citations omitted).
264. Id. (citations omitted).
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patent assignment. But it is hard to imagine what else would adequately
protect the government's interest. If our version of history is correct, DoC
staff who promulgated the Bayh-Dole regulations may simply have not
wanted to mandate an express requirement of patent assignments for a con-
tractor's employees, and certainly not an exact form of such agreement, be-
cause this was not expressly authorized under Bayh-Dole's statutory
provisions. Further, the mistaken assumption following from the Biddle Re-
port still enabled government patent policy makers to leave the task of secur-
ing appropriate rights from contractor employees to the contractors
themselves. In some ways, it was a convenient fiction for all parties
involved.
In the end, the Court's most astute and practical observation was that
"[w]ith an effective assignment, those inventions-if federal funded-be-
come 'subject inventions' under the Act, and [section 202(d)] as a practical
matter works pretty much the way Stanford says it should." 265 But, the un-
certainty of what constituted an "effective assignment" and whether all uni-
versity contractors would put them in place, troubled the dissent. 266 At the
same time, the dissent misread the history, or at least read it through the eyes
of those who had always believed that federal funding should result in gov-
ernment ownership or public dedication of the inventions, such as the Biddle
Report and the Squier and Houghton courts. Thus, the dissent was concerned
that federally funded inventions would improperly wind up in private
hands.267 But the Supreme Court, multiple presidential administrations, and
even Congress (by passing Bayh-Dole) have rejected the strong government
title and public dedication view. Accordingly, the real problem remains the
mistaken assumption that contractors are all able and willing to institute such
"effective assignment" agreements with employees. This has not been fixed
by the Court's decision in Stanford.
CONCLUSION
Government patent policy underwent profound changes in the twentieth
century. With roots in nineteenth century case law that intertwined issues of
government use of private patents, ownership and use of government em-
ployee inventions, and ownership and use of contractor inventions, govern-
ment patent policy became regularized through Congressional acts and
executive orders. But the faulty conclusion of the Biddle Report that con-
tractors were securing assignments from employees led to the likewise
flawed conclusion that government patent policy need only concern itself
with the relationship between contractor entities and the government.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 2202-04.
267. Id.
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Arising from a highly influential and authoritative report issued at the
inception of the post-war boom in federal extramural R&D spending, these
twin conclusions were bound to be relied on. And indeed they justified a
mistaken assumption that all contractors were, and would continue, securing
assignments from employees. While government officials who promulgated
the GSA and Bayh-Dole regulations sought to operationalize this assumption
by requiring contractors to obtain written agreements to protect the govern-
ment's interests, the language of the regulations was too cryptic to push
universities to institute present assignments of expectant interests similar to
the practice of private firms. As the balance of federal extramural R&D
funding flipped from private firms to universities, the failure of the latter to
secure present assignments became a problem.
We are likely just seeing the beginning of these problems. There are
now decades worth of "promises to assign" and inadequate faculty handbook
policies purporting to assign faculty inventions. Even as universities scram-
ble to replace these inadequate forms with present assignments, the repercus-
sions of inventions that may have already been assigned to third parties may
be felt for years to come. Further, it is not clear that universities will be able
or willing to impose new present assignment agreements upon their faculty
without some form of consideration or shared governance consultation. At
the same time, both the dissent in Stanford and some commentators believe
that the Federal Circuit's distinction between present assignments and
promises to assign, as well as its creation of "Federal Circuit law" (essen-
tially federal common law), are wrong as a matter of law.2 68 Accordingly,
legal challenges will likely arise on these points. Depending on the outcome
of those challenges, universities may need to yet again overhaul their assign-
ment practices.
At the same time, faculty inventors are feeling their power and many
groups are pushing for more faculty-inventor rights, including the right to
choose licensing agents for their inventions-even if they must still assign
ownership to their university employer.2 69 Some allege that university tech-
nology transfer offices are not very good at facilitating the practical applica-
tion of faculty inventions, 27() hindering both commercialization-patents,
licenses, and revenues-and willingness to explore free, open, and low cost
dissemination of the inventions for the public good. Thus, Stanford v. Roche
is not the end of the story; it is rather the beginning of a new chapter in the
ongoing and complex dialogue regarding government patent policy. Hope-
268. Id. at 2202-03.
269. See, e.g., IP ADvocATEr, http://www.ipadvocate.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
270. Id.; see also Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University Innovations: A Bet-
ter Way (Nat'i Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper JEL No. 018, Mi3, 033, 034, 038
Apr. 2007).
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fully this time contractor employees will be brought into the mix, both as
participants and as a class of stakeholders whose rights and obligations must
be expressly part of any new policies that emerge.
